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POSTWAR FRENCH FOREIGN CLAIMS PRACTICE:




Before World War II, belief in the absolute private control of real
and personal property enjoyed astonishing universality. True, there were
notable exceptions. But by and large, recognition of private wealth as
the sine qua non of the social fabric scarcely wavered. It is thus un-
surprising that in 1926, during an International Law Association
discussion concerning "the inviolability of private property in inter-
national relations," the Soviet Union should have been condemned for its
"attack upon this international agreement as to the sacredness of private
property" and for its failure to "agree with the common conscience of
all other civilized nations upon this most fundamental question of morals
and ethics," and, so, judged, "exclude[d] and excommunicate[d]
from the society of civilized nations."'
The war, of course, helped to change all this. Where once socialist
ideologies were alone mainly responsible for the erosion of laissez-faire
values, now the unprecedented depredation of whole economies (and at-
tendant fears of foreign economic domination) combined with them to
place the State at stage-center of economic ownership and control. Never
as in the years immediately following World War II, save for the Mexi-
can, Soviet and, to lesser degree, "Succession State" experiments of the
interwar years, had the State become so extensively involved in the eco-
nomic enterprise. Little by little over the years, but now overwhelmingly
by comparison, direct and indirect interference with private wealth (do-
mestic and foreign), on major and minor scale, became a fundamental
strategy-a "determined system" 2-of national policy, most notably in
Eastern Europe. In Czechoslovakia (1945-48), Poland (1945-48), Hun-
gary (1945-49), Yugoslavia (1946-47, 1956), Bulgaria (1942, 1946-49)
and Rumania (1946-50)-progenitors of things to come there again and
elsewhere--was the tale thus writ large.
t Associate Professor of Law, The University of Iowa. Member of the New York
and Iowa bars. The author takes special pleasure in thanking Mr. Roger P. Smith of the
third-year class of The University of Iowa College of Law for his gracious and pains-
taking assistance in the preparation of this article for which, of course, the author as-
sumes full and sole responsibility.
1. INT'L L. Ass'N, REPORT OF THE THmTY-FouRTH CONFERENCE 259 (Vienna, 1926).
2. K. KATzAROV, THE THEORY OF NATIONALISATION 75 (1964).
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For French foreign investors (direct and portfolio), as for their
counterparts from abroad (particularly from Great Britain, Switzerland
and the United States), these postwar Eastern European developments
augured ill. Of course, it is well known that the French suffered extra-
ordinary financial losses during and soon after World War I-losses in
excess of four billion dollars, "or nearly half the French investments
outstanding at the beginning of the war."3 Well known also is the
failure of French foreign investments newly made during the interwar
period to exceed, in the aggregate, the losses sustained; "[b]y 1938,
the total of French foreign investments amounted to roughly 3.9 billion
dollars, against which there were obligations of about 560 millions,
leaving net investments of about 3.3 billions." 4  In sum, France (until
World War I at least, long second only to Great Britain among the world's
creditor nations) was by World War II only fourth in rank among the
world's creditor countries (behind Great Britain, the United States and
the Netherlands, in that order).' Yet for all this, and despite World War
II losses, French foreign investors were still to suffer major economic
sacrifices in Eastern Europe in the years immediately following the
Axis surrender. As of 1938, apparently the last year for which figures
are readily available, long-term French investments ranked foremost
among all long-term foreign investments in Poland, Yugoslavia, and
Czechoslovakia (respectively, first, second and fourth in hosting French
capital in Eastern Europe), second in Bulgaria (last among the six
hosts), and fourth in both Rumania and Hungary (respectively, third and
fifth in hosting French capital).' Significantly, the total of these French
3. U.N. DE'T OF EcoN. AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS DURING
THE INTER-WAR PERIOD 4 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1949. II. D. 2). These losses were due
not only to the war itself, but also to (a) the 1918 Soviet repudiation of governmental,
industrial and war debt obligations of predecessor Russian governments, (b) the
virtual repudiation of Turkish and Austro-Hungarian bonds by "Successor State"
governments, (c) liquidation of highgrade securities and (d) the depreciation of
the French franc. See C. Lwis, DEBTOR AND CREDITOR COUNTRiES: 1938, 1944, at 10
(1945).
4. C. LEwis, supra note 3, at 10. "This compares with some 7.6 -billions net in
1914." Id.
5. Id. 2-11.
6. The following table, depicting the amount of the long-term Eastern European
investments of the major investing countries as of 1938, is drawn from C. LEwIs, supra
note 3, at 54-99:
(all figures are in millions of dollars)
BuIg. Czech. Hung. Pol. Rum. Yugo.
Benelux 10.8 - 2.7 42.1 12.0 5.3
France 22.5 39A 32.6 165.2 69.7 101.6
Germany 1.5 1.6 46.0 70.5 75.0 2.8
Italy 4.8 - 8.0 18.9 16.0 11.3
Neth. .3 3.3 6.0 18.1 83.3 1.8
Sweden - 1.0 2.8 53.9 45.0 3.0
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investments (431.1 million dollars) represented about forty-three per
cent, or nearly half, of the aggregate long-term French foreign invest-
ments outstanding in Europe generally in 1938 (998.2 million dollars);
and this, in turn, represented approximately twenty-six per cent of French
long-term investments world-wide.! Add that few French interests in
Eastern Europe, least of all the major ones, wholly escaped the Popular
Democratic reach and that they were usually to receive little or no direct
compensation for their losses,8 and it is little wonder that the French,
however much they may themselves have domestically accepted public
ownership of the means of production, should have greeted postwar
Eastern European developments with some consternation.
How the French were to react to, and cope with, these and later
deprivatory measures elsewhere, or, more precisely, how French foreign-
wealth owners have been able (if at all) to obtain compensation for
postwar governmental assaults upon their property, is the focus of a study
on which this writer is currently working and for which this essay is
meant as a tentative introduction.9 Limited, however, by a dearth of
printed data on the subject and by an inability, as yet, to examine relevant
French dossiers and personally to question, except fleetingly, informed
French authorities, the pages following must necessarily be confined to
merely a preliminary account of the substantive and procedural
framework of the postwar French foreign claims process. Detailed
description and appraisal of this process and particularly its outcomes,
singly and in comparison with equivalent American and British practice,
must await later exposition.
Since 1945, as before, consistent with customary international prac-
Switz. 9.2 31.0 14.2 24.6 12.2 23.0
U.K. 48.9 35.9 86.6 66.5 215.0 25.5
U.S. 7.9 15.9 57.0 79.2 52.5 38.3
7. Id.
8. These facts have been abundantly though not exhaustively treated elsewhere.
See G. VIENo, NATIONALISATIONS "-TRANG-RES ET INTAR-TS FRANCAIS 26-29 (1953).
See also G. FOUILLOUX, LA NATIONALISATION ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
90-104 (1962); S. FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 29-50 (1953);
K. KATzAROV, supra note 2, at 53-64; S. SHARP, NATIONALIZATION OF KEY INDUSTRIES
IN EASTERN EUROPE passimz (1946); G. WHITE, NATIONALISATION OF FOREIGN
PROPERTY 183-93 (1961); B. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
66-70 (1959) ; LEs NATIONALISATIONS EN FRANCE ET A L'TRANGER: LES NATIONALISA-
TIONS A L"RTRANGER passim (H. Puget ed. 1958) ; Doman, Postwar Nationalizatlion of
Foreign Property in Europe, 48 COLUm. L. REv. 1125 (1948) ; Herman, War Damage
and Nationalization in Eastern Europe, 16 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 498 (1951).
9. Part of an extended inquiry into the lump sum settlement-national claims com-
mission device sponsored by the recently founded Procedural Aspects of International
Law Institute, the study is intended to result in a companion volume to R. LILLICH,
INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: POSTWAR BRITISH PRACTICE (1967). For a critique and
synoptic account of the latter, see Weston, Book Review, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 196
(1967).
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tice and in keeping with the orthodox theory that "whoever ill-treats a
citizen indirectly injures the State,"1 French nationals with claims
against foreign governments for alleged international wrongs ordinarily
have had to seek redress of their grievances by convincing the Quai
d'Orsay to espouse their claims for them.1 As Professor Berlia has
succinctly remarked, "[si l'€tat] n'intervient pas, il n'y a pas liaison du
contentieux sur le plan international et l'individu lsi restera sans
recours contre les d6cisions de droit interne, jurisdictionelles ou autres,
qui ont pu lui faire grief."' 2 Of course, this presupposes at least that
the French claims are contested by the foreign government. The French
Government will not intervene-at least in principle-when, for example,
the foreign country undertakes satisfactorily to indemnify the French
nationals to whom it has caused damage (as when French interests,
harmed by postwar British nationalization measures, accepted virtually
without discussion the indemnity proposed by the British Government),
or when, for another, the foreign government provides realistic oppor-
tunities for redress through its own internal processes of decision. 3 As-
suming such conditions are satisfied, however, it is generally understood
that the Minist~re des Affaires P-trang~res, without liability for potential
mishandling of claims, 4 will intervene to settle the foreign claims raised.'
10. E. DE VATrEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, liv. 2, § 71 (1758).
11. Sec G. VIENoT, supra note 8, at 38.
12. Contribution a I'ltude de la Nature de la Protection Diplomatique, ANNUAIE
FRANCAIS DE DRoIr INTERNATIONAL 63 (1957).
13. This is confirmed in correspondence dated December 5, 1967 from M. Henri
Glaser, "Secr~taire Gfnral" of the Association Pour la Sauvegarde et 'Expansion des
Biens et Intfir~ts Franais a l'Atranger (374, Rue Saint-Honor6, Paris le). As might
be inferred from its name, one of the many functions of this private association has been
to serve an intermediary role between French foreign investors and the French Foreign
Ministry in connection with the promotion of these interests at home and abroad. Copies
of the correspondence [hereinafter cited as "Glaser Correspondence-12/67"] are available
on request.
14. See the case of In re Taurin and Merienne, [1955] D.S. Jur. 361, decided by
the Conseil d'etat on October 29, 1954, in which it was held that French courts must
decline to entertain claims of French nationals that arise out of alleged negligence of
the French Government in conducting negotiations with foreign governments. As
recounted in 21 I.L.R. at 16, "[tlhe Court said that the owners of a ship . . . taken by
the British authorities in exercise of the right of angary during the Second World War
: * . were not entitled to sue the French government for damages for alleged negligence
in failing to obtain on their behalf sufficient compensation from the British Government."
15. It deserves mention, however, that while the French Foreign Ministry has
been the usual advocate of such claims, it has not been the only one. Sometimes, also,
the French Ministry of Finance has assumed this role. This is inferred in G. VIENOT,
supra note 8, at 229 and confirmed explicitly in correspondence dated November 13,
1967 from M. Andr6 Ernest-Picard, "Directeur" of the Association Nationale des Por-
teurs Franqais de Valeurs Mobili~res (22, Boulevard de Courcelles, Paris, 17e). The As-
sociation, a quasi-public utility created in 1898 by the Chambre Syndicale des Agents de
Change de Paris at the request of the then French Minister of Finance, has as its main
functions the enlightenment and assistance of French bondholders and stockholders, espe-
cially those with interests abroad. Copies of the correspondence [hereinafter cited as
"Ernest-Picard Correspondence-11/67"] are available on request.
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Historically, it has done so in ways that parallel closely the experience
of the British Foreign Office and the United States Department of State
(if not others also) : principally through individual diplomatic espousal,
mixed claims comnmission or other international arbitral adjudication, and
"lump sum," "en bloc" or "global" settlement followed by national
claims commission adjudication of each claim."6 Each of these techniques
has been employed by France since 1945. The 1958 accord, securing
compensation from the United Arab Republic for French interests
divested by Egypt's nationalization of the Compagnie Universale du
Canal Maritime de Suez, for example, is perhaps the best-known recent
product of the venerable practice of individual diplomatic espousal.'" Sim-
ilarly, as after World War I, mixed arbitral tribunals were constituted
following World War II mainly to resolve war damage and related debt
claims.'" The last principal alternative, the lump sum settlement-national
claims commission device, has been resorted to in direct response to the
major and minor wealth deprivations 9 spawned by postwar Eastern
16. As to British practice, see P. LILICH, supra note 9, at 1-3. As to United
States practice, see DEP'T OF STATE MEMORANDUM, NATIoNALISATIoN, INTERVENTION OR
OTHER TAKING OF PROPERTY OF AMERICAN NATIONALS (March 1, 1961), in 56 Ai.
J. INT'L. L. 166 (1962) and quoted in Professor Lillich's book at 1 n.3. For further details
on United States practice, see R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR ADJIJDICA-
TION BY NATIONAL COmmiSSIONS 5-15 (1962).
17. For the accord, see 14 REV. EGYPTiENNE DE DROrr INT'L. 338 (1958), 54
Am. J. INT'L L. 493 (1960).
18. See, e.g., the Franco-Italian Mixed Commission established in accordance with
the Treaty of Peace of February 10, 1947 pursuant to the Treaty Between France and
Italy of November 19, 1947 (Decree No. 48-1934), [1948] J.0. 12436. This is not to say,
however, that France used the mixed commission to resolve only war damage
claims. See, e.g., the Franco-Egyptian accord of August 22, 1958 (Decree No. 58-760
of August 22, 1958), [1958] J.0. 7919, which provided for a mixed commission to
adjudicate post-Suez "sequestration" claims.
19. The term "wealth deprivation" and such derivatives as "deprivation measure!'
and "deprivation claim" are used principally to avoid the simultaneous and, hence,
ambiguous reference to both facts and legal consequences which so often characterizes
the more popular "expropriation," "confiscation," "condemnation," "taking," forfeiture,"
and the like. It is, therefore, conceived as a neutral expression which describes the
pu lic or publicly sanctioned imposition of a wealth loss (or blocking of a wealth gain),
by whatever means, with whatever intensity and for whatever claimed purpose, which,
in the absence of some further act on the part of the depriving party, would involve
the denial of a quid pro quo to the party who sustains the deprivation (the component
"wealth" being preferred to the more popular "property" because it refers to all the rele-
vant values of goods, services and income without sharing the latter's common emphasis
upon physical attributes nor the Civil Law's stress on "ownership"). Depending on a
multitude of factual variables, a wealth deprivation may be found lawful or unlawful. As
implied and as thus defined, however, the term is superior in ways other than its descrip-
tive neutrality. By stressing more the results than the implementing procedures of the in-
stitutional practice, it underscores the ultimate gravamen to which all claims arising out
of any interaction are addressed: value change. At the same time, but without straint of
legal-technical language, it affords a broad mantle under which a variety of institutional
procedures may take shelter, whether the archetypal "direct taking" or its many "in-
direct" functional equivalents. Finally, it more readily admits that there can be a loss by
one party without there being a one-for-one gain by another.
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Europe. The precise concern of this essay (and of the larger study antici-
pated), we may now turn to its examination.
Like the United Kingdom, the United States and other major
powers, France has negotiated numerous lump sum settlements over
the years." However, only the United States appears to have utilized na-
tional claims commissions to any significant degree for post-settlement
adjudication before 1945.2 At any rate, there is no evidence now known
to indicate that France ever used the combined lump sum settlement-
national claims commission device before the Second World War. Why
not? Partly, no doubt, because of "juri-political" perspectives and tradi-
tions special to France in the prewar era. But mainly, it seems, because
there was little before 1945 to challenge severely the more traditional
methods of foreign claims settlement and distribution. The number of
claims requiring resolution at any one time seldom exceeded in amount or
kind what individual diplomatic espousal (or private negotiation) and
administrative repartition could accommodate. And when it did become
excessive, in which case specially constituted mixed tribunals were usually
found helpful, the context of resolution was typically one in which widely
shared notions of laissez-faire justice and fair dealing were quite easily
transmuted into broad patterns of acceptable international behavior. The
need for bold alternatives simply did not present itself.
The years immediately following World War II, on the other hand,
seem ineluctably to have compelled the lump sum settlement-national
claims commission device (for others as well as for France). The magni-
tude and importance of the claims that arose and the new revolutionary
context within which international diplomacy was required to function
served to highlight both the inherent and the circumstantial weaknesses
of traditional French strategies and, so, to render impractical, if not
impossible, all other means of settlement and distribution. Gilles Vienot,
author of what thus far appears to be the sole extended (but now
incomplete) inquiry into postwar French foreign claims practice,22 has
20. A useful working definition of "lump sum settlement" has been given by a
former chairman of the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.
"[A] 'lump sum,' 'en bloc' or 'global' settlement involves an agreement, arrived at by
diplomatic negotiation between governments, to settle outstanding international claims
by the payment of a given sum without resorting to international adjudication. Such
a settlement permits the state receiving the lump sum to distribute the fund thus
acquired among claimants who may be entitled thereto pursuant to domestic procedure."
Re, Domestic Adjudication and Lump-Sum Settlement as an Enforcement Technique,
1964 PROCEED. Am. Soc'v INT'L L. 39, 40. Compare M. LiTMANs, THE IxTENATIoNAL
Lumsr-Sum SETTLEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (1962).
21. See R. LILLiCH, supra note 9, at 3.
22. Supra note S. M. Vienot is presently connected with the Association Pour la
Sauvegarde et l'Expansion des Biens et Intrts Francais 5 l' tranger. See note 13
supra.
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detailed the point at some length.23 Against the backdrop of multiple
claims and revolutionary politics, he traces the factors which, derived
from this setting, necessitated innovation. Compelling the hmp sum
agreement ("l'indemnisation globale et forfaitaire"), he notes, were the
following principal needs: (a) from the French standpoint, a need for
real and collective bargaining power (thus militating against private
mediation by "un groupement de d6fense" or diplomatic negotiation of
"un accord sur les principes de l'indemnisation" or such other devices
as would likely dilute or otherwise limit satisfactory recovery) ; and (b)
from the Eastern European point of view, a need for safeguarding
socialist conceptions of sovereign authority and control over the economic
process (thus preventing resort to mixed arbitral devices where relatively
independent decision might create compromising or otherwise undesirable
precedent). And necessitating the national claims commission ("commis-
sion de r6partition"), he further notes, were the following two key fac-
tors: first, the aforementioned Eastern European refusal to consider the
establishment of mixed claims tribunals24 and the consequent settlement
provision that "la r6partition de l'indemnit6 globale et forfaitaire entre
les intress~s relive de la seule competence du Gouvernement franqais";
and, second, a clear (but, Vienot argues, not altogether justified) "r&
pugnance" on the part of concerned French interests for the quasi-
discretionary and political character of "la r6partition administrative"
contrasted with their complementary preference for more rigorously
institutionalized impartiality and professionalism." In sum, relatively
unprecedented circumstances called for relatively unprecedented solutions.
As might be expected, however, the ltmp sum settlement-national
claims commission solution that was ultimately to prevail, at least insofar
as claims against Eastern Europe were concerned, was hardly so apparent
as these observations would have us believe. Historical reconstructions
have a way of making things seem more rationally conceived than they
actually are, of causing us to forget that decisions are the product of
human, and iso fallible, perceptions. A case in point, strikingly so when
we note the concurrent negotiation and prior conclusion of the 1948 lump
23. Id. 73-87, 223-229.
24. See also Sarraute & Tager, Les effets en France des atimionalisations
itrangres, 79 J. DRorr INTL. 1138, 1171 (1952). This refusal was not limited to French
claims negotiations alone, however. See R. LILLICH, spra note 9, at 3. But cf. text
accompanying notes 115 and 116 infra.
25. This point is emphasized by M. Glaser who writes that the French Government
"wished to create a system that would be secure from the encroachment of executive
power. This consideration conformed to the principle of the separation of powers[and] tended to assure the claimants that they were to be equitably judged"' Glaser
Correspondence-12/67 (author's transl.), supra note 13.
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sum agreement between France and Poland, 6 is the Franco-Czech con-
vention of August 6, 1948, relating to the compensation of French
interests damaged by the Czech nationalization decrees of October 24,
1945.27
One of two French postwar claims agreements with Eastern Europe
that was not a lump sum accord,28 it records not only how little is to be
gained when mutuality of expectation is absent between negotiating
parties, but also the uncertain plight in which French officials found
themselves when trying to assess the meaning of post-1945 Eastern
Europe. Premised on the seemingly naive assumption that the nation-
alization decrees in question were only provisional and that Czechoslo-
vakia would soon return to the fold of "economic and political libera-
lism, ' '2 it amounted to little more than a statement of "indemnisation en
principe," with Czechoslovakia agreeing to pay directly, but in its
discretion, "une indemnit6 adequate et 6ffective"' 0 to French claimants
who, by direct and separate appeal to appropriate Czech authorities8'
under a "most-favored-nation" regime,2 could prove the legitimacy of
their claims. Considering the large discretion thus left to the Czech
Government, 2 not surprisingly this venture proved far from conclusive.
Perhaps in fairness to the French we should note that similar and pre-
sumably exemplary (but also ultimately unsuccessful) experiments with
Czechoslovakia were undertaken by the linguistically related Swiss and
Belgian governments." But the fact remains: Czechoslovakia persis-
26. Accord and Additional Protocols Between France and Poland of March 19, 1948
(Decree No. 51-1288 of Nov. 7, 1951), [1951] J.O. 11190 [hereinafter usually referred
to as the "Polish Accord of 1948" or the "1948 Polish Accord"].
27. Accord Between France and Czechoslovakia of August 6, 1948, reprinted in
G. ViENOT, supra note 8, at 147-48 [hereinafter usually referred to as the "Czech
Accord of 1948" or the "1948 Czech Accord"]. Neither this agreement nor its companion
Special Accord, Additional Protocol and two "lettres-annexe" of the same date, also
reproduced by G. VIENOT at 149-54, were ever officially published in the Journal Off iciel
de la Ripublique Francaise. The reason, Vienot notes at 131-32, is that the French Gov-
ernment, displeased with the arrangement reached, never submitted the Accord for ap-
proval to the French Parliament. Cf. note 77 infra.
28. The other, with Yugoslavia in 1948, sought to establish a mixed commission to
adjudicate private French claims. See text accompanying notes 115 and 116 infra.
29. G. VIENoT, supra note 8, at 123-25.
30. Czech Accord of 1948, art 1, para. 1.
31. Id. art. 2.
32. Id. art. 6. The provision continues: "[tihey [French nationals] will not be,
in any case, less well treated than Czech nationals." (author's transl.)
33. As Vienot has written, "[d]ans le silence de la convention, chaque intress6
se voit contraint d'entreprendre seul des pourparlers avec les autorit6s tch~coslovaques,
c'est dire qu'il en sera r~duit A accepter, ou refuser, des propositions qu'il ne pourra
discuter avec ffficacit6 puisque, la plupart du temps, il ne disposera d'aucune des
contreparties qui permittent, au contraire, lors d'une negotiation intergouvernementale,
de s'opposer A des pretensions adverses jug6es excessives." Supra note 8, at 130.
34. See G. WHIm, supra note 8, at 199-201. However, according to Dr. White, one
such agreement, the Agreement Between the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia of
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tently challenged both the legitimacy of the French claims involved and
the amount of compensation sought. 5 The need for an alternate solu-
tion was thus made vividly-and painfully-clear.
The predominant solution, as indicated, was the lump sum settle-
ment-national claims commission device. To its principal details we may
now turn.
II. THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS
Consider, first, the first half of the device: the lump sum agreement.
Since 1948, exclusive of war reparation agreements with the Axis
Powers and agreements pursuant to which France indemnified others
for French deprivation measures, France has negotiated a known thirteen
of these accords, all but two with the countries of Eastern Europe."'
All, by explicit provision, anticipate (or, more accurately, invite) adjudi-
cation of each claim by a French claims commission. Considering their
separate relevance to the repartition process, later to be described, it is
best to proceed one by one.
A. The Polish Settlement
1. The Accord of March 19, 1948
The first such agreement was the Polish Accord of March 19,
1948,"r providing for "a complete and outright indemnification of
French interests affected by the Polish law of 3 January 1946." '
Signed in Paris after months of hard work, with French negotiators
(public and private) assuming "une position r6aliste,"' 9 the Accord and
November 4, 1949, appears to have been successful. She writes that since it "was not
superseded by a lump-sum compensation agreement ... it may perhaps 'be assumed that
the individual procedure proved workable in this case." Id. 199.
35. G. VIE'oT, supra note 8, at 130.
36. One lump sum agreement not with Eastern Europe is the recent Convention Be-
tween France and Cuba of March 16, 1967 (Decree No. 67-853 of Sept. 20, 1967), [1967]
J.O. 9761, relative to the indemnification of French interests damaged by Cuban socialist
reforms since January 1, 1959. The other, though not wholly true to the general form
and substance of the typical French lump sum agreement, is the earlier Convention Be-
tween France and the United Arab Rpublic of July 28, 1966 (Decree No. 67-874 of Octo-
ber 4, 1967), [1967] J.O. 9939, concerning the compensation of French interests affected
by 1956 and post-1958 Egyptian nationalization and other measures. This agreement
brought to a close the resolution of outstanding French deprivation and other claims
against the U.A.R. begun with the Accord Between France and the United Arab Repub-
lic of August 22, 1958, supra note 18. This latter accord, however, was not a lump sum
agreement as defined above (see note 20 supra). Nor, it would seem, is the Accord Be-
tween France and Morocco of July 24, 1964 concerning the indemnification of French in-
terests prejudiced by Moroccan agrarian reform laws. By this agreement, not yet offi-
cially published, Morocco appears simply to have accepted the principle of compensation.
For a brief expos6 of this accord see 68 REv. GtNPRALE Du DRoiT INT'L PUB. 941, 943
(1964).
37. Supra note 26.
38. Id. preamble (author's transl.)
39. G. VIENoT, supra note 8, at 92.
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its three protocols of the same date predated by nearly five months the
abortive Czech Accord of 1948.40
Considering the breadth and magnitude of the known and projected
claims involved,41 the Accord strikes one as suprisingly concise and
unambiguous. There is little doubt, for example, that it was intended to
represent a full and final settlement of virtually all French interests
directly prejudiced by the named Polish nationalization law." Nor is
there much question as to who was deemed eligible to benefit from the
settlement. The Agreement deliberately eschewed referring simply and
broadly to "French interests" (although it failed to detail the date or
dates upon which French nationality might be determined). Individual
French nationals ("personnes physiques"), French companies ("soc-
it6s"), companies under French control, and natural or juridical French
persons having a minority share, however small, in all other companies
(i.e., those neither owned nor controlled by French nationals)-all were
expressly included,4" even to the point of specifying many of the
intended beneficiaries (including concessionaires) by name and in-
dustrial category" (though French creditors of these beneficiaries were
to receive compensation "according to the terms of the respective
laws in force")." Nor, further, was the meaning of the term "national-
ization," often the subject of much confusion, left to question. Both the
title of the Accord and the preamble expressly tied the settlement to the
Polish nationalization law of January 3, 1946.46 In short, if major
ambiguity existed it was, seemingly, in the following respects only: (1)
in the meaning, for purposes of correct distribution, of the categories of
eligible claimants listed, and (2) in the precise terms by which French
creditors could be compensated, if at all."
Mlost important, neither the question nor the terms of payment were
left in much doubt (as was the case, it may be recalled, with the Czech
Accord of nearly five months later). This is in itself significant, obviously.
In retrospect, however, what is most noteworthy about this most critical
consideration is less the clarity actually achieved than the choice or
40. See note 27 supra.
41. For details see G. VIENOT, supra note 8, at 65-66. See also the other authorities
cited at note 8 supra.
42. Polish Accord of 1948, preamble and arts. 2 and 3. The sole limitation was that
the interests affected be within the then existing Polish frontiers. See art. 2.
43. Id. art. 4.
44. Id. art. 4 and "Annexe."
45. Id. art. 3 (author's transl.).
46. The title reads: "Accord sur l'indemnisation par la Pologne des int&r&ts
frangais touches par la loi polonaise du 3 janvier 1946 sur les nationalisations."
47. This is unclear because existing French and Polish law foresaw the payment of
creditors generally, but not their indemnification specifically. G. ViENoT, supra note 8,
at 94.
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economics of payment clearly agreed upon. In lieu of money compensa-
tion, the usual medium of settlement, the High Contracting Parties chose
to fix indemnification (subject to France's simultaneously extending
financial credits equal to fifty per cent of the value thereof) in terms of
3.8 million tons of high-grade coal ("charbon flambant"), f.o.b. Polish
ports, with the first two million tons to be delivered according to a
tentative schedule (and pursuant to specifications detailed in the com-
panion protocols) covering the fifteen-year period 1951-1965, and the
remaining 1.8 million tons according to schedules subsequently to be
established.48 To speed individual repartition (derivable from French
sales of the coal, presumably in France), Poland agreed to issue bonds
made out for the amounts of coal designated for delivery, these to be
given to whatever "organisme" France specified and to be restored to
Poland when the equivalent deliveries shall have been made." To the
respective negotiators, this "value-tying" means of payment not only
obviated having to debate--perhaps irreconcilably-troublesome questions
of international legal principle, but it allowed for the rapid re-opening of
friendly commercial relations. True, only about sixty million dollars
of an estimated 250 million dollars of losses were covered by the Agree-
ment." Surely French claimants would have liked more. True, also,
France was obliged to bear the risk of a fall in the price of
coal over the delivery years. 1 Tying compensation to a hard currency
would no doubt have been preferred. But Poland, ravaged by war, could
scarcely grant more and France, anxious to stabilize her shaky economy
and to avert the kinds of wholesale losses she sustained from the Soviet
deprivations of three decades earlier, could ill afford to chance any less.
2. The "Protocol d'Application!" of September 7, 1951
As noted, the 1948 Polish Accord was intended as a full and final
settlement of virtually all French interests directly injured by the Polish
nationalization law of January 3, 1946. Accordingly, its complementary
Protocol of September 7, 1951,2 giving expanded expression to the
term "nationalization" as used in the 1948 Accord, must have come as
something of a surprise to those who thought this to be true. No longer
was the 1948 Accord restricted to compensating French interests affected
48. Polish Accord of 1948, art. 6.
49. Id. art. 7. These bonds were to be issued within three months of the Accord's
effective date.
50. G. VlENo'r, supra note 8, at 98.
51. See Bindschedler, La Protection de la Proprjtj Privie en Droit International
Public, 90 HAGUE ACADtMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL RECUEIL DES COURS 173, 263
(11-1956).
52. "Protocole d'Application" Between France and Poland of September 7, 1951,
[1957] J.O. 7780 [hereinafter referred to as the "1951 Polish Protocol"].
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by the 1946 law. Henceforth, it was intended to cover also those French
interests which, as of the effective date of the 1948 Accord, had sustained
deprivations as a result of (a) "agrarian and forestry reform," (b) "the
municipalisation of 'Warsaw terrains" and (c) "all other measures restric-
tive of the right of property." 3 Noteworthily, the Protocol seems un-
equivocally to have extended protection, if its complementary predecessor
did not, even to those interests prejudiced by what has come to be called
"creeping expropriation."" Curious, however, is that this dilution of
the 1948 indemnity (already small), in lieu of another lump sum
payment, was deemed necessary. In light of the only known (and sharply
critical) commentary on the subject,5 one is led to conclude that the
kinds of considerations that likely influenced the 1948 Accord continued
to prevail in this negotiation.
3. The Accord of September 7, 1951
It will be recalled that the 1948 Polish Accord left rather ambiguous
whether and how French creditors of the Accord's intended beneficiaries
could receive compensation." Vienot suggests that the French negotiators
53. Id. (author's transl.)
54. This additional coverage, it may be noted, was extended in all of the Eastern
European settlements that followed. The point is mentioned here to avoid its reiteration
hereinafter. But see note 78 infra. As to the kinds of "creeping expropriation" that are
possible and for an explanation of the meaning of the term, see Weston, Interamtional
Law and the Deprivation of Foreign Wealth: A Framework for Future Inquiry, to be
published in 1969 by Princeton University Press in the second volume of a series entitled
THE FUrTuR oF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OR)ER (C. Black and K. Falk, eds.).
55. The commentary is one given by the "President et Rapporteur" of the Com-
mission des Affaires 1-conomiques, des Douanes et des Conventions Commerciales, M.
Rochereau, at the time of the Protocol's presentation for ratification to the Conseil de
]a R6publique, more than nine months after its signing:
At the time [of the negotiation of the 1948 Polish Accord] our negotiators
let themselves be carried away to the extent of considerable renunciations
[of claims]. They justified them then by the difficult situation in Poland
The 1948 Accord affects a large number of small shareholders in
French enterprises doing business in Poland and industrial groups still active
there. These shareholders and industrialists who, as a result of the delay
in enforcing the Accord, have not yet received even the smallest portion of
these reduced indemnities, now see curtailed once again the meager indemnities
they had every right to hope would be definite. This curtailment is moreover
subject to the highest criticism juridically, since it would alter legislative
provisions adopted in 1948 by the two governments, and which constituted
solemn engagements on behalf of those concerned. These latter can therefore
legitimately request that the French Government take into consideration, in
the payment of the nationalization indemnities, the new hardship that is
imposed upon them. This can be accompilshed either by refusing to ratify
the protocol, which is practically impossible and is not recommended by the
Commission [des Affaires ]conomiques], or by an equitable fixing of the
price at which France takes Polish coal and for which the Treasury currently
declares a reduction to a level as low as it is unjustified. [1952] J.0. 1361(D~bats Parlementaries, Conseil de la R~publique) (author's transl.).
56. See note 47 supra, and accompanying text.
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must have determined that these creditors should themselves bear some
of the loss that their debtors (i.e., the intended beneficiaries) were re-
quired to suffer." The instant settlement, the Polish Accord of Septem-
ber 7, 1951, and its accompanying protocol,"8 fifth in a series of settle-
ments since 1948 (exclusive of the 1951 Polish Protocol)," appears to
confirm this view. But while providing nothing for these 1948 creditors,
it nonetheless permitted a significant variety of French creditors to profit
from French perseverence and Polish largesse (or possibly vice versa).
Designed to intensify "les relations 6conomiques r6ciproques"' 0
between the two countries, and thereby to further the spirit of 1948, the
Accord provided for a settlement of 4.2 billion francs a, final compen-
sation for French creditor claims against (a) the Polish Government
and (b) Polish State enterprises and private juridical persons which
(i) matured before 1939, (ii) resulted from accords concluded during
World War II, or (iii) were founded on named titles issued before Sep-
tember 1, 1939.1
No doubt influenced by their contemporaneous negotiating experi-
ences, the respective negotiators were quite explicit as to how this sum
should be allocated for distribution purposes. Thus, subject to the con-
ditions above noted, the following allocation was stipulated:
(1) 1,008 million francs (or twenty-four per cent of the total in-
demnity) in full satisfaction of all claims of the Tr~sor Public
against the Polish State arising out of financial engagements
contracted before or during World War II ;02
(2) 2,604 million francs (or sixty-two per cent of the total indem-
nity) in full satisfaction of all claims of French holders of five
named securities and of all securities issued or guaranteed by the
Polish Treasury, State enterprises or private Polish businesses
(the claimants to have been French nationals as of September
57. G. VxNo, .rupra note 8, at 94.
58. Accord and "Protocole d'Application" Between France and Poland of September
7, 1951 (Decree No. 57-892 of July 26, 1957), [1957] J.O. 7779 [hereinafter usually re-
ferred to as the "Polish Accord of 1951" or the "1951 Polish Accord"]
59. In addition to the 1948 Polish Accord, the French had also by this time con-
cluded one settlement each with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia. These are
discussed below.
60. Polish Accord of 1951, preamble.
61. Id. art. 1, (emphasis added). A mixed Franco-Polish financial committee
evaluated these creditor claims in 1948. Because this evaluation was keyed to
different currencies, however, it is difficult to state precisely the adequacy of the
indemnity agreed upon. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the lump sum negotiated
represented less than twenty-five percent of the total value of these claims as of 1948.
For details see 0. MOREAU-NARET, VALEUR' ]ATRANG-RES, MOUVEMENTS DE CAPITAUX
ENTRE LA FRANcE ET L'URTANGER DEPUIS 1940, 180-82 (1956).
62. Polish Accord of 1951, art. 1 (A).
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7, 1951) ;" and
(3) 588 million francs (or fourteen per cent of the total indem-
nity) in full satisfaction of all French creditor claims against
the Polish State, Polish State enterprises and "institutions" of
Polish law arising out of contracts for equipment and work or
out of loan contracts concluded before September 1, 1939.4
The terms of payment were equally explicit. Because of their
"value-tying" character, however, they were also, as in the 1948 Polish
Accord, both the most noteworthy and potentially most uncertain
feature of the Accord. Consistent with the preamble-to guarantee
future Franco-Polish trade--payments by Poland were to be levied on
a biannual basis against the value of French imports under commercial
agreements in force between the two countries at the times of account. 5
The biannual payments were to be proportionately allocated, as received,
twenty-four per cent to the Tr~sor Public, sixty-two per cent to French
creditors listed under "(2)" above, and fourteen per cent to French
creditors listed under "(3)" above."8
Finally, securities representing Polish indebtedness were to be re-
turned to Poland upon indemnification." The Accord was of course to
have a liberating effect upon that government, there being no right
of appeal to the Polish Republic in respect to the distributed sums. 8
B. The Czech Settlement
The Czech Accord of 1948, it may be recalled, stipulated that
French interests affected by 1945 Czech nationalization decrees should
present their claims directly to the Prague Government. It may also be
recalled that these claimants encountered not a little difficulty in pressing
their claims. When Czechoslavokia neither impeded claimant access nor
denied the legitimacy of the claims presented (apparently a rare occur-
rence), still she allowed only for a complex (if not onerous) system of
indemnification-part in Czech crowns to be used only in Czechoslovalda
and part in bonds whose amortized portion could be transferred abroad
only by a reduction in the Czech share in the balance of payments between
the two countries." Predictably, concerned French interests sought
63. Id. art. I(B).
64. Id. art. 1 (C).
65. Id. art. 2. This, of course, was to result in payment over an indefinite period of
time
66. Id.
67. Id. art. 4.
63. Id. art. 5.
69. See 2 AFFAIRES PITRANGMES 12-14 (Oct. 1950). This journal is a publication of
the Association Pour la Sauvegarde et l'Expansion des Biens et Intirats Frangais i
'-tranger. See note 13 supra.
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more and more the energetic intervention of the Quai d'Orsay.
The result, bolstered by relative success in the Franco-Polish negotiations
of 1948 and hastened both by a French refusal to renew remunera-
tive commercial agreements with Czechoslovakia except upon a satis-
factory claims settlement and by a propitiously felicitous change of
power in Prague,"° was the Franco-Czech Accord of 1950 (together
with two supplementary protocols and two "lettres-annexes" of the same
date)."' Another agreement to be noted later, in a sense less important
than this accord, was signed between the two governments in January,
1964.72
The principal agreement, proclaimed "une solution d~finitive" on
the indemnification of French nationals deprived in Czechoslovalda,"
represented a marked improvement in French negotiating prowess and a
formal annulment of its 1948 predecessor. 4 "[A] titre d'indemnit6 glo-
bale forfaitaire,"' it called for a net payment by Czechoslovakia (sup-
plementing 550 million francs already turned over to France under the
1948 Accord) of 365 billion francs (payable in twenty biannual install-
ments 76), or a gross payment of 4.2 billion francs.7 7 The sum was to
cover: (a) the French interests earlier treated under the 1948 Accord;
(b) all other French interests affected "as of the effective date of the
accord" by "une mesure . . . de nationalisation, d'expropriation ou
toute autre mesure restrictive" bearing upon reforms directed at the
Czech economic structure; and (c) French interests then actually involved
in "procddures en restitution" in Czechoslovakia.7 ' As under the Accord of
70. For details see G. VIENoT, NATIONALISATIONS I TRANGkRES ET INTRETS FRAN-
cAis 131-33 (1953).
71. Accord and Additional Protocols Between France and Czechoslovakia of June 2,
1950 (Decree No. 51-1286 of November 7, 1951), [1951] J.0. 11188 [hereinafter
usually referred to as the "Czech Accord of 1950" or the "1950 Czech Accord"].
72. See text accompanying notes 84-85 infra.
73. Czech Accord of 1950, preamble.
74. Additional Protocol No. II, art. 3, supra note 71.
75. Czech Accord of 1950, art. 1.
76. Additional Protocol No. II, art. 1, supra note 71.
77. Id. Although the 1948 Czech Accord was never ratified by France, it was
ratified by Czechoslovakia. Pursuant thereto Czechoslovakia did make some tentative
transfers in 1948 and 1949 in consideration of claims that Prague considered legitimate.
See note 27 supra. For subsequent adjustment of the payment terms agreed upon, see
the Rider ("Avenant") attached to the 1950 Czech Accord on June 6, 1956 (Decree No.
59-668 of May 5, 1959), [1959] J.0. 5379.
78. Czech Accord of 1950, art. 1 (emphasis added). As in the 1948 Polish Accord,
"'creeping expropriation" claims again appear to have been recognized. There results,
of course, a certain suspense from the negotiators' reluctance (perhaps deliberate
refusal) to define precisely the meaning of "toute autre mesure restrictive." Considering
the intended finality of the Accord, conceivably this uncertainty was deliberately
sought by the Czechs and resisted by the French, serving as it did to eliminate
altogether the possibility of pressing pre-1950 claims in the future and to dilute con-
.siderably an already less than complete recovery. See text accompanying note 79 infra.
Considering also the nearly identical imprecision that was to emerge in the 1951
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1948, the final distribution of this sum-which, according to Vienot,
represented about half the (market?) value of the losses sustained"9
-was stated to be within the sole competence of the French Government."0
Finally, to assure the indemnity, a commercial agreement, held out by
France as a lure to settlement, was expressly provided, with France
agreeing to import during each year of the Accord an amount of Czech
commodities equal to 150 per cent of the annual indemnity payments.8
In its basic aspect, then, except for the medium of payment chosen,
this Czech settlement was not unlike its Polish counterpart, since it also
contained "value-tying" arrangements. In three important ways, however,
they differed significantly.
First, the Czech settlement, unlike the Polish, all but ignored French
creditor claims. Thus, whereas the 1951 Polish Accord indemnified
creditors with claims against the Polish Government, its enterprises or
its nationals (as of 1939 or 1951, depending on the nature of the debt),
the 1950 Czech Accord restricted coverage to the debts of Czech com-
panies alone, and then only to the extent that the intended beneficiaries
held at least a fifty percent interest in the debtor firms." Of course,
accuracy compels underscoring that it was not until more than three years
after the initial Polish agreement and more than one year after the Czech
settlement that French creditor claims against Poland were even recogniz-
ed. In properly understood sequence, the 1950 Czech Accord represented
only the second of France's forays into the postwar Eastern European
lump sum settlement process. However, when it is recalled, on the one
hand, that a wide variety of creditor claims was expressly recognized in
later settlements (particularly in the Polish, as noted, and in the Yugoslav
and Rumanian) and that, on the other hand, France and Czechoslovakia,
with one special exception, subsequently negotiated no further lump
sum settlements, then it seems not unreasonable to infer that the omission
Polish Protocol (see text accompanying notes 52-55 supra), probably this was a neces-
sary, perhaps even appropriate, price to pay for the restoration of friendly relations.
79. Supra note 70, at 137.
80. Czech Accord of 1950, art. 7. Supplementary language, consistent with this
statement and similar to language found in both the 1948 Polish Accord and the 1951
Polish Accord, proscribed all future recourse by the French Government and its
nationals against the Czech Government, its institutions or its nationals in respect of
the claims covered. See Exchange of Letters, Annex No. 1 of June 2, 1950 (Decree
No. 63-735 of July 10, 1963), [1963] J.O. 6811-6812. However, this was not to preclude
future claims. See art. 9 of the principal accord.
81. Czech Accord of 1950, art. 6. See also Additional Protocol No. I, art. 2, supra
note 27. The commodities were to be fixed each year by agreement 'between the two
governments. For the first five years, however, the imports were to follow a commodity
list annexed to the Accord.
82. Additional Protocol No. I, art. I(b), supra note 71. Arguably, this provision,
by its sheer existence, requires strict construction of Article 2 of the Principal Accord
which extends coverage to "all French interests." See text accompanying note 78 supra.
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was here due primarily to the fact that French creditor claims against
Czechoslavokia were less voluminous and so, presumably, less pressing
than they were against other Eastern European powers.8" The one
special exception that must be seen to modify this somewhat is a Franco-
Czech Protocol signed in 1964.84 Under this agreement, by which the
High Contracting Parties aimed to settle "toutes les questions financifres
encore en suspens entre les deux pays,"85 Czechoslovakia agreed, inter
alia, to "redeem" all outstanding French debt claims resulting from a
1930 long-term six percent "equipment loan" issued by the since nation-
alized Socit6 des Anciens Ptablissements Skoda (now known as the
"Usines V. I. Lnine") up to an amount, "brut et forfaitaire," equal
to sixty-one percent of the nominal value of the debts outstanding."6
Second, the lump sum indemnity obtained under the 1950 Czech
Accord appears on its face to have been more satisfying to the French
than the indemnity obtained in the Polish equivalent (the 1951 Polish Ac-
cord aside). In the first place, as noted, the Czech settlement represented
about half the market value of the claims covered, whereas the 1948 Po-
lish recovery amounted to about twenty-four percent of the claims out-
standing.8" Further, the Czech Accord, unlike the Polish, expressly re-
leased the intended French beneficiaries from all manner of debts owed,
including taxes due, prior to the Czech interventions88 (a factor that was
expressly taken into account in arriving at the lump sum finally agreed
upon) .89 Not to be overlooked either is the fact that the Czech payments,
being in French francs and so, unlike coal, not subject to wide commodity
market fluctuations, were both more effective and more readily transfer-
able than the Polish payments.
Finally, the Czech settlement achieved in some respects still greater
precision than its Polish counterpart. For example, whereas both settle-
ments made French nationality a pre-condition for compensatory eligi-
bility, only in the Czech Accord was this requirement keyed to specific,
83. Accord, Dette Exterieure Tchcoslovaque, COMMUNICATIONS No. 459 OF THE
AssociAnoN NATIONALE DES PORTEURS FRANCAIS DE VALEURS MOaaIIP, ES (October 15,
1960). See also text at notes 3-8 supra. At any rate, if the 1939 long-term French
obligations of Poland (165.2 million dollars), Rumania (69.7 million dollars) and
Yugoslavia (101.6 million dollars) in relation to equivalent Czech obligations (39.4
million dollars) are any indication, then the inference seems proper. See C. LEwis,
DmroR AND CREDITOR CouNRmIEs: 1938, 1944, at 57, 69, 70 and 75 (1945).
84. Protocol Between France and Czechoslovakia of January 16, 1964 (Decree No.
64-149 of February 15, 1964, [1964] J.0. 1755.
85. Id. preamble.
86. Id. Title I.
87. See text accompanying notes 50 and 79 supra.
88. Czech Accord of 1950, art. 5.
89. Id. art 6. As Vienot has remarked, supra note 70, at 137, this was not an
insubstantial element considering alone that Czech taxes on foreign property, rights and
interests often amounted to as much as thirty percent of their value.
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determinative dates, i.e., from the date of the relevant measure ("A la date
des measures tch~coslovaques") to the effective date of settlement ("et i
la date de l'entr~e en vigueur du present accord").9 Also successor
interests, about which the Polish accords were silent, were expressly
declared eligible to the extent that they had matured prior to the "inter-
vention des mesures" specified in the principal text. 1 Further still,
and here finally, several provisions not found in the Polish accords de-
tailed at some length the inter-governmental cooperation deemed neces-
sary to facilitate the processing of individual claims.92
On balance, then, the Czech settlement appears to have been more
satisfactory from the French point of view than the Polish settlement.
Probably this reflected a growing sophistication on the part of the
French negotiators. This is a fair assumption, at any rate, when the
achievements of the French are compared with those of other countries
in their equivalent Czech dealings.
C. The Hungarian Settlement
French wealth deprivation claims against Hungary, like those
against Poland, were settled by more than one agreement (a pattern that
was to emerge yet again in the Yugoslav settlement). In the case of Hun-
gary, two agreements were involved: the first in 1950, the second in 1965.
In general, they combined to present a basic outline not very different from
the settlements already described.
1. The Accord of 1950
The first accord was signed on June 12, 1950,"' only ten days after
the 1950 Czech Accord just examined. Considering this short lapse of
time, it seems a small surprise that it did not follow more closely the
language and format of the latter. The extraordinary ambiguity of some
aspects of the agreement make it also to be regretted. However, it is
less the linguistic and structural differences than the substantive similari-
90. Czech Accord of 1950, art. 2. It may be noted that this was tantamount to a
restatement of the so-called customary continuous nationality rule. See OPPENHEim,
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 155b (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht, 1955). Arguably, therefore, this
could be read into the 1948 Polish Accord.
91. Additional Protocol No. I, art. 1(a), supra note 71.
92. Czech Accord of 1950, arts. 4 and 8; Additional Protocol No. I, art. 4, supra
note 71. This was probably a product of the special difficulties between the two
countries after the 1948 Accord. Article 4 of the 1950 Accord provided that Czechos-
lovakia was to be notified of the rulings on individual claims and of the integral
payment of indemnities as later drawn up. The reason for this provision is not self-
evident. Perhaps it reflected a Czech interest in keeping final individual indemnification
within reason.
93. Accord Between France and Hungary of June 12, 1950 (Decree No. 52-1079 of
September 23, 1952), [1952] J.O. 9260 [hereinafter usually referred to as to the
"Hungarian Accord of 1950" or "the 1950 Hungarian Accord"].
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ties and dissimilarities between these agreements, and the 1948 Polish
Accord as well, that are of most interest.
Like its Polish and Czech predecessors, thus, it clearly intended a de-
finitive and unreviewable settlement of the various deprivatory claims
covered. 4 Likewise, it called for a lump sum payment, "globale et
forfaitaire": i.e., the equivalent in French francs of 914,285 dollars (320
million francs) payable in five annual installments, and 2 million Hun-
garian forints (59,600,000 francs) payable on the signing of the
Accord.9" This, in turn, as in the 1950 Czech Accord, was calculated
with an eye to the release of the intended beneficiaries from all charges
and obligations whatsoever."8 As before, also, the final distribution of
the global indemnity was to rest within the sole competence of the French
Government.9 And finally, once again, the settlement was seen by the
parties as a means to restoring mutually profitable commercial relations."
WVhat, then, were the differences? As can be seen, they were both
major and minor in character.
Among the more or less minor variations, for example, was
the absence of any reference to a named deprivatory measure, there-
by leaving more indefinite (or flexible) who in fact might properly
claim losses from, and so compensation for, such measures. Paral-
leling a 1950 Czech provision, the Agreement aimed simply to in-
demnify French interests affected, generally, by "les mesures de nation-
alisation, d'expropriation ou de restriction d'un caract&re similaire."' 9
Further, whereas the various Polish and Czech agreements had specified
relatively clearly the dates that would determine nationality-eligibility
(except the 1948 Polish Accord which was completely silent on the
subject), the matter was here treated most ambiguously: beneficiaries
(natural or juridical) were required to have been French nationals "at
the moment of origin of their rights to indemnification."1 ' Unclear,
obviously, is whether this was intended to mean the date of loss, the date
of claim, the date of judgment or any other of a number of possible times
which have proved diacritical in the past. Also, and here finally, the lump
sum payment promised by Hungary was not in any apparent way, as be-
fore, tied to, or dependent upon, the amount of export earnings that Hun-
gary would receive under the anticipated renewal of commercial relations
94. Id. preamble and art. 4.
95. Id. arts. 1 and 2. The equivalent figures are taken from 0. MOREAu-NPRET,
supra note 61, at 173.
96. Hungarian Accord of 1950, art. 6.
97. Id. art. 7.
98. Id. art. 9. For text see note 101 infra.
99. Id. preamble. For the significance of this clause, see notes 54 and 78 supra.
100. Id. art. 3 (author's transl.).
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between the two countries. The most that can be said is that a resumption
of trade was seen simply as a precondition for the settlement of still
outstanding accounts'' (though it is not now known what outstanding
accounts in fact remained).
There remains, finally, the more or less major differences between
these settlements. Three stand out.
First, and perhaps most important, the Hungarian settlement was
not restricted, like the predecessor Polish and Czech settlements, to the
resolution of "nationalization," "expropriation" or similar claims. The
indemnity promised by Hungary was also to cover war damage claims
for which Hungary had become responsible under the 1947 Treaty of
Peace. 2 The absence of like provisions in the Polish and Czech accords
is of course explained by the fact that those countries, unlike Hungary,
were not allied with the Axis Powers during World War II.
Second, whereas the Polish and Czech settlements manifested, more
or less, a willingness-if at first somewhat reluctant-to compensate
various creditor claims, the 1950 Hungarian Accord went quite the
opposite route, at least insofar as post-1939 debt claims against the
Hungarian State were concerned. Not simply silent on the subject, it
explicitly (though not altogether clearly) precluded "revindicating" to
those damaged by the war and by postwar Hungarian deprivation
measures such debts as may have been owed them as a result of
"loans and advances of whatever kind of movable or immovable property,
previously effected by Hungary in the name of the above mentioned
demands," making them "the property of their [Hungarian] holders
upon the signing of the present accord"; and further, it "annulled" all
"interests and charges to which these loans or advances may have been
subject."'0 3 The provision is ambiguous at best. It does not tell whether
the State debts and related charges repudiated were obligations that
matured before, during or after World War n, or indeed, at all three
of these times. On the other hand, it seems possible that debt claims
against other than the Hungarian Government were not deemed ineligi-
ble, a conclusion which finds some support elsewhere in the Accord (albeit
again ambiguously) . °' At any rate, whatever the precise interpretation
101. Id. art. 9, which reads: "If the commercial accord between the two countries
should not be renewed, the two governments shall draw up by mutual consent a list of
commodities to be exported by Hungary to France, in order to settle still outstanding
accounts." (author's transl.).
102. Id. preamble.
103. Id. art. 8 (author's transl.).
104. Id. art. 3: "French demands . . . are to 'be considered demands motivated by
the measures or based upon the clauses set forth ['viss'] in the preamble, whether
emanating from the French State, or directly or indirectly from natural or juridical
French persons. . . , without distinction between demands presented to the French
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of the provision, there is nothing now known to explain its inclusion.'
One can but infer that the French must have determined here, as before,
that it was best to distribute the burden of loss (or the amount of
recovery) among the deprived parties as widely as possible.'
Finally, the indemnity promised by Hungary was less in absolute
terms than the indemnities at least initially promised by Poland and
Czechoslovakia. Partly explained by a comparative absence of French
investment in Hungary in the first place, it was also due, as one com-
mentator has noted, to French entrepreneurs having alienated practically
all their enterprises in Hungary before nationalization."0 '
2. The Accord of 1965
Though stylistically superior, there is little to distinguish this
agreement.0 from its 1950 predecessor. Its three major differences
can therefore be quickly reviewed.
First, the purpose of the Accord was to settle, once and for all, "the
financial claims outstanding between the two countries relative to French
property, rights and interests affected by nationalisation, expropriation
or restrictive measures of a similar character taken by the Hungarian
Government and not covered by the Franco-Hungarian Accord of 12
June 1950... ."'0' To this end, Hungary agreed to pay France 1,150,000
francs in three installments ending fourteen months after the signing of
the Accord."0
Second, the Agreement offered both a different and less ambiguous
statement of the dates that would be determinative of nationality-
Government, the Hungarian Government or to an auxiliary authority of these govern-
ments, or demands not yet presented." (author's transl.).
105. The Exchange of Letters, Annex No. 3 (reprinted in G. VImor, supra
note 70, at 211) does advise, however, that the provision was to be interpreted with
reference mainly to movables and immovables at the actual disposal of the French
legation in Hungary.
106. It should be mentioned, however, that this may in turn have been deemed
justified because other and arguably more pressing French creditor claims against
Hungary, e.g., debt claims based on certain loan issues of the Credit Foncier of
Hungary, had already been settled through earlier "financial agreements" with Hungary.
In this connection, see Obligationm 3-1/2% 1899 et 4% 1910-1912 de la Sociitj de Cridit
Foncier de Hongrie, Riglement Forfaitaire, COMMUNICATION No. 425 OF THE AssocIA-
TION NATIONALE DES PORTEURS FRANcAIS DE VALEuRs MoILIRas, (August 10, 1950).
See also O. MOREAu-NLRET, supra note 61, at 176.
107. 0. MOREAU-NARET, supra note 61, at 173. The author also notes that the part
of the indemnity that was to be paid in Hungarian forints was destined, principally, for
French persons living in Hungary. Id.
108. Accord Between France and Hungary of May 14, 1965 (Decree No. 65-589
of July 15, 1965), [1965] J.0. 6308 [hereinafter usually referred to as the "Hungarian
Accord of 1965" or the "1965 Hungarian Accord"]. This accord was anticipated in
Article 5 of the 1950 Hungarian Accord.
109. Id. preamble (author's transl.).
110. Id. art 2.
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eligibility. Thus, whereas its 1950 predecessor required intended bene-
ficiaries to have been French nationals "at the moment of origin of their
rights to indemnification," the 1965 Accord required French nationality
"on the date that these measures were taken and on the date of signature
of the present accord.""' This, it will be recalled, is identicial to the
like provision in the 1950 Czech Accord and again amounts to an
incorporation of the customary continuous nationality rule.
Finally, unlike its 1950 forebearer, this agreement contained no
explicit renunciation of French creditor claims arising out of Hungarian
deprivation measures. Neither, however, did it explicitly recognize such
claims. On the other hand, when it is observed that the Accord sought
to settle "all claims not covered by the Franco-Hungarian Accord of 12
June 1950 and resulting from Hungarian nationalization and expro-
priation and similar measures of a restrictive character,""' 2 the assump-
tion that all manner of creditor claims may have been deemed eligible
hardly seems far-fetched.
In sum, the 1965 Accord was essentially a supplement to its 1950
predecessor. Its principal aim was simply to bring to a close both the
claims that had remained and those that had arisen in the interim.
D. The Yugoslav Settlement
Following the liberation of Yugoslavia in 1944, French property,
rights and interests there encountered numerous difficulties. As Vienot
recounts, "French property and interests found themselves the targets of
the confiscation of property disguised as German or Italian, of prosecu-
tions for collaboration with the enemy, [and] of fiscal arrangements
resulting in the sequestration and liquidation of war earnings and
illicit profits.""' These measures, he charges, "constituted no more than
a series of pretexts to permit the Yugoslav Government to seize private
property and interests."" 4 Of course, the historical accuracy of this
sweeping charge can be debated. But what matters is that the French,
apprised of the situation generally, protested a number of these measures
and in 1945 secured an agreement from Yugoslavia (as did Belgium,
Sweden, Switzerland and Czechoslovakia for like reasons) to establish
a mixed commission for the purpose of settling the grievances that
existed."' All this, however, came to naught,"' and France, next
111. Id. art. 1.
112. Id. (emphasis added) (author's transi.).
113. Supra note 70, at 167 (author's transl.).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. The experience of the analogous commissions constituted between
Belgium, Sweden, Czechoslovakia and Switzerland on the one
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faced with the Yugoslav nationalization law of December 5, 1946, began
soon to seek alternative means of settlement.
The final solution, though, was not quick to come. The Yugoslavs
were in no mood without further inducement to negotiate a settlement
that would in any way compromise their socialist principles or burden
any more their already fractured economy. Not until more than two
years later, with Yugoslavia under increased pressure to trade with the
West (due mainly to the rupture in her commercial relations with the
Soviet Union and the other Cominform countries), was any progress
possible. On May 21, 1949, after both sides had diligently clarified their
positions, France and Yugoslavia concluded two protocols (and a com-
mercial agreement). The first called for negotiations by no later than
October 1, 1950 (a) to settle the question of French property, rights, and
interests affected by Yugoslav nationalizations and "autres mesures
restrictives," (b) to rule on private commercial and financial debts owing
to French nationals, (c) to set conditions and time-limits for settlement of
the Yugoslav public debt, and (d) to conclude a long-term "accord
d'6quipement." And the second provided for deposit in a special Yugo-
slav account in the Bank of France of a sum in French francs equal to
1.6 million dollars ultimately to be transferred to France for nationaliza-
tion and similar claims against Yugoslavia as part of the global indem-
nity eventually to be fixed."7
In this setting, followed by continued but alternatingly friendly and
stormy negotiations, the two governments at last agreed to the first of the
three lump sum settlements that were finally to be concluded beween them.
1. The Settlement of 1951
This settlement, comprised of six separate agreements and a "procs-
verbal"," reflected the concern for breadth and specificity that marked
its negotiation. It represented the most comprehensive and detailed
single settlement yet to be secured by France with Eastern Europe.
The principal accord-together with its companions, the "Protocole
Additionnel" and the "Protocole Financier"--echoed the same basic
hand, and Yugoslavia on the other, caused the French authorities
to conclude that mixed commissions were without power -by reason
of the excessive limitation on their competence, the absence of a
third-party arbiter and the recalcitrance ["sujetion"] of the
Yugoslav delegation. Thus restricted, such an organism could not
arrive at any positive result. Id. 167-68 (author's transl.).
117. Id. 169-71.
118. Accord and Additional Protocol Between France and Yugoslavia of April 14,
1951 (Decree No. 53-653 of July 24, 1953), [1953] J.0. 6723 (hereinafter usually
referred to as the "Yugoslav Accord of 1951" or the "1951 Yugoslav Accord"). A
Financial Protocol, a "Procs-Verbal", and three accords of the same date between the
two countries are reprinted in G. VIENoT, supra note 70, at 202-07.
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themes that had been variously struck with Poland, Czechoslovakia and
Hungary: indemnification ("globale et forfaitaire") of French property,
rights and interests in Yugoslavia "affected" by Yugoslav measures of
"nationalisation, d'expropriation et autres mesures restrictives de car-
act~re similaire,""'  assured or conditioned, in part, by levies against
proceeds derived from Yugoslav exports to France;12 individual re-
partition within the sole competence of the French Government'21
without further recourse against Yugoslavia, its institutions or its
nationals;122 French nationality-eligibility expressly keyed to the cus-
tomary continuous nationality rule;.2 inter-governmental cooperation
in the processing of individual claims;.2 and so forth. The actual in-
demnity agreed upon (an estimated twenty-five percent of the actual
losses suffered 20 or, specifically, the equivalent in French francs of
fifteen million dollars,' mostly payable over a ten-year-period 2 ) was of
course somewhat complicated by the stipulations of the earlier Protocol
of May 21, 1949."'
For all the similarity, however, one key item serves to distinguish this
initial settlement from those heretofore noted: the specificity with which
eligible French claimants-particularly creditor claimants-were identi-
fied. ' Thus, in addition to declaring generally eligible all French per-
sons ("physiques ou morales") affected by the postwar deprivatory
measures enumerated1. (including, less broadly, all French shareholders
of Yugoslav enterprises), ' the principal accord detailed the French
creditor claimants who, likewise damaged by these postwar measures,
could recover :13.
119. Yugoslav Accord of 1951, preamble and art. 1.
120. Financial Protocol of April 14, 1951, arts. 2 and 3, supra note 118.
121. Yugoslav Accord of 1951, art. 6.
122. Id. arts. 2, 3 and 6.
123. Id. art. 2 (i.e., "i la date on ces mesures ont 6t6 prises" and "& la date de
la signature du pr6sent accord").
124. Id. arts. 4 and 8.
125. See G. VIENor, NATIONALISATIONS ]ITRANGkRES ET INTEImETs FRANcAIs 127
(1953).
126. Yugoslav Accord of 1951, art. 1.
127. Id.
128. See note 117 supra. The Additional Protocol of April 14, 1951, and the Fin-
ancial Protocol of the same date (supra note 118) took the 1949 Protocol into account in
specifying the terms of payment. Under the latter, two 500,000 dollar payments of
the initial disbursement of 1.6 million dollars were to be deposited to a Yugoslav
account in the Bank of France; the remaining 600,000 dollars were to be converted to
pesetas by France to levy on Yugoslavia's share of the liquidation of German property
in Spain.
129. Although the 1951 Polish Accord was reasonably specific, it was not as detailed.
130. Yugoslav Accord of 1951, art. 1.
131. Id. art. 2. This provision was given still greater precision by an attached
schedule of specific claims tentatively recognized as eligible.
132. Id. art. 5.
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(1) all creditors with private debt claims accrued in Yugoslavia af-
ter 1945 (these creditors being released from all debts owed by
them in Yugoslavia);
(2) majority shareholders of Yugoslav companies holding post-
1945 private debt claims against such companies outside France
(these creditors, too, being released from all debts owed by
them); and
(3) holders of post-1945 private debt claims against Yugoslav
companies outside France, the majority of whose shares were
owned by French nationals (again, these creditors being re-
leased from all debts owed by them).
To these were added, by the "Protocole Financier" and three comple-
mentary accords of the same date :..
(1) the Trdsor Public, for interest due from Yugoslavia between
1940 and 1945 on French Treasury loans issued in 1923 and
1921;
(2) the Socit6 de Construction des Batignolles, a large creditor of
the Yugoslav Government; and
(3) private French lenders to whom Yugoslavia had at some time
become obligated, for interest due between 1940 and 1954.
In short, seemingly the only postwar French claimants not entitled to
benefit from the settlement (or not forfeited) were creditors who held
post-1945 private debt claims outside Yugoslavia against Yugoslav in-
dividuals or Yugoslav companies having only minority French participa-
tion."3 The most comprehensive and detailed treatment of eligible claim-
ants to date, this fact alone distinguishes this settlement from the others.
Also distinguishing, finally, was the apparent (though implicit)
abandonment, at least in part, of the so-called principle of territoriality
that prevailed in the other settlements. As may be seen, the 1951 Yugoslav
Accord provided for the forfeiture (upon indemnification) of most
French debt claims not only within Yugoslavia, but outside as well. In
effect, France said that it would generally honor Yugoslav claims to the
extraterritorial application of Yugoslav deprivation measures. Admit-
tedly, this extraterritorial recognition concerned only creditor claims,
and not all such claims at that. But one is led to ask, as has Vienot,8 5
what other claims (apart from those few not covered by the settlement)
could be pressed outside Yugoslavia if, as seems to have been conceded,
133. Supra note 125, at 202-07.
134. Of course, prewar creditors were not covered either, except to the extent that
there were interest payments due them from 1940.
135. Supra note 125, at 176.
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private Yugoslav operations functioning abroad were extinguished
through an extraterritorial application of Yugoslav laws. The only
apparent answer, implied in the 1951 Accord, would be debt or contract
claims within France itself."' Which is to say, in effect, that extraterri-
torial recognition stopped at the French border. Otherwise, or so it
would appear, the French forfeiture was near complete.
2. The Revisions of 1955 and 1958
The indemnity required by the 1951 settlement, it will be recalled,
was to be drawn partly from proceeds derived from Yugoslav exports to
France. Risky though this may seem in theory, it must not have seemed
injudicious at the time. For as of 1951, according to one report, France
ranked about sixth in importance in Yugoslavia's external trade." 7
The future, of course, was not guaranteed, and if this arrangement was
to be meaningful it was imperative that Yugoslav exports to France be
substantial and productive. Regrettably, however, this was not to be the
case. Soon after, Yugoslavia was to suffer a severe economic crisis, due
mainly to a series of bad harvests, and this was inevitably to have
considerable impact on her ability to export. By April 14, 1954, when
payments derived from export proceeds were due to end, monies advanced
to France amounted to only about twenty-five percent of that required
by the 1951 schedule.' Predictably, the French were concerned, and in
late May 1954, over a month after the expiration of the "Protocole
Financier" of 1951 (but pursuant thereto),"' the two countries resumed
negotiations with a view to concluding new financial arrangements to
replace those stipulated in 1951. This led, first, to the Protocol of July 27,
1955 (covering the period April 15, 1954 to April 14, 1957)140 and, sec-
ond, after further protracted negotiations strongly influenced by intermit-
tent disagreement over the treatment to be accorded French holders of
136. Yugoslav Accord of 1951, art. 5(4). Expressly prohibited was the right of a
French shareholder of a Yugoslav company, on the one hand, and the right of a
Yugoslav company, on the other, to proceed against debtors of the other outside France.
137. La commerce franco-yougoslave a la lumre des statistiques de commerce
cxterieur yougoslave, 7 AFFAIREs PRANGAMES C.1, C.5 (Jan. 1952), a publication, it will
be recalled, of the Association Pour la Sauvegarde et l'Expansion des Biens et Int~rats
Frangais . l' tranger (see note 13 supra). The others ahead of France in this regard were
Great Britain and the United States (the major commercial powers) and Germany,
Italy and Austria (the traditional external markets of Yugoslavia).
138. See response 'by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to written question of M.
Andr6 Armengaud of March 8, 1955, [1955] J.O. 630 (D~bats Parlementaires, Conseil
de Ia Rgpublique).
139. Supra note 125, art. 6.
140. The author has been able to locate only a typewritten copy of this unpublished
Protocol. A copy thereof is available on request.
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Yugoslav public loans, 4' to the Accord of 1958.142 Taking into account
that the payments stopped on April 14, 1954 and April 14, 1957,
respectively, and without otherwise altering the 1951 settlement, these
agreements simply modified the terms by which the balance due on the
1951 lump sum indemnity would be paid. Evincing little new in the way
of substantive (or jurisprudential) prescription, they need not be further
detailed here. It needs only to be remarked that together they served to
resolve definitively and with like precision the settlement that was envi-
sioned in 1951.
3. The Accord of 1963
As comprehensive in coverage (though comparatively inadequate in
payment) as the 1951 settlement was, it did not provide for the indemni-
fication of all pre-1951 creditor claimants. Nor did the complementary
revisionary agreements of 1955 and 1958 attempt to settle post-1951
claims arising out of further economic reforms in Yugoslavia."" A
result of continued mutual concern for enduring economic relations, the
Accord of July 1963, like its later Hungarian counterpart of 1965 (for
which it must have served as precedent), was designed to fill this gap.'
And so it did, except insofar as it apparently continued the earlier
exclusion (or non-forfeiture) of post-1945 private debt claims out-
side Yugoslavia against Yugoslav individuals and Yugoslav com-
panies with only minority French participation.'45 Thus, providing
for an indemnity "globale forfaitaire" of the equivalent in French francs
of 200,000 dollars, payable in two annual installments, 4 ' the Accord
stipulated as settled, definitively and without recourse,'47 two rather
comprehensive sets of claims:
141. See Jaudon, Rapport Moral, 32 AFFAIREs PTRANG S B.1, B.11 (2nd Trim.
1958). See also, Jaudon, Rapport Moral, 28 AFFAIRES TRANG RES B.10-B.11 (2nd
Trim. 1957). Monsieur Jaudon is the President of the Association Pour la Sauvegarde
et l'Expansion des Biens et Int6r~ts Fran~ais A 'Rtranger.
142. Accord Between France and Yugoslavia of August 2, 1958 (Decree No.
59-654 of May 5, 1959), [1959] J.O. 5244.
143. For an account of these further reforms, in French, see La situation
iconomique de [a Yougoslavie et les reformes envisagbes, 59 AFFAIRES ]TRANGtRES
A.1 (2nd. Trim. 1965).
144. Accord Between France and Yugoslavia of July 12, 1963 (Decree No. 64-239
of March 13, 1964), [1964] J.O. 2525 [hereinafter usually referred to as the "Yugoslav
Accord of 1963" or the "1963 Yugoslav Accord"].
145. As to the possibility that this may be an inaccurate interpretation, see the
"Avis" of the French Foreign Ministry of July 22, 1964, [1964] J.O. 6505, which refers
to eligible claimants as "natural or juridical French persons with debt claims not covered
in the Accord of 14 April 1951 as well as those whose property has been affected by a
Yugoslav measure of dispossession after that date." (author's transl.).
146. Yugoslav Accord of 1963, art. 1.
147. Id. art. 3.
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(1) "all claims not covered by the Accord of 14 April 1951 and re-
sulting from Yugoslav nationalization and expropriation meas-
ures and other measures of similarly restrictive character that
have affected, up to the date of the present accord, [French]
property, rights and interests in Yugoslavia or French partici-
pation in enterprises in Yugoslavia, owned by natural or juridi-
cal French persons ;148 and
(2) "all debt claims anterior to 15 May 1945 held by natural or
juridical French persons against natural or juridical Yugoslav
persons or the Yugoslav State."'49
For the deprivation claims, French nationality was required both at the
time the measures were taken and at the signing of the accord, thus again
incorporating the customary continuous nationality rule. And for the
debt claims, nationality was required both on May 15, 1945 and at the
signing of the Accord.'
Beyond this, the Accord contained little new of interest. It even
incorporated and made applicable, mutatis mutandis, Articles 3 through 9
of the 1951 Yugoslav Accord."' And this meant of course, among other
things, that individual repartition would rest here, as before, within
the sole competence of the French Government.
E. The Bulgarian Settlement
Bulgaria, like Hungary, joined the Axis alliance during World War
II. Also, like all her sister Eastern European republics, she entered upon
important and widespread economic reforms in the immediate postwar
era. Both these factors contributed to a spate of French (and other)
claims against the Sofia Government. Still, it was not until 1955 that a
settlement of these and related grievances was finally realized. Regret-
tably, all the reasons for this comparatively long delay are not yet known.
Probably it was partly due to French preoccupation with the other claims
settlements already noted. Also, it may have resulted from the relatively
small and, so, perhaps psychologically inconsequential French investment
in Bulgaria during the relevant war and postwar periods. Further still,
and implied by the very terms of the settlement, it may have been due to
disagreement between the two governments which bore less upon the
issue of war damage and postwar claims than upon other issues al-
together. Yet whatever the reasons, the fact remains that, once having
come to terms, France and Bulgaria were able, unlike between France and
148. Id. art 2 (author's transi.). Coinpare "Avis" of July 22, 1964, supra note 145.
149. Id.
150. Id. art. 2.
151. Id. art. 4.
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other Eastern European countries before, to resolve their differences in
one apparently definitive settlement: the Accord and companion "Pro-
tocole d'Application" of July 1955.152
Conditional on Bulgaria's paying (at an unspecified time but accord-
ing to a detailed transfer arrangement) 53 an indemnity "globale et
forfaitaire" of 1.5 billion francs (slightly more than 4.25 billion dol-
lars),"" supplemented as needed by a seven percent levy on French
purchases of Bulgarian exports,'55 France agreed to liquidate, defini-
tively and without recourse, 5 ' the following three classes of claims :...
(1) "indemnities due by reason of Bulgarian measures of nationali-
zation, expropriation, confiscation, requisition or other meas-
ures of total or partial dispossession which affected the prop-
erty, rights and interests of natural or juridical French per-
sons" ,158
(2) "obligations due natural or juridical French persons which de-
volve upon Bulgaria pursuant to the Treaty of Peace of Feb-
ruary 19, 1947 (war damages, restitutions, etc.)"; [and]
(3) "obligations due natural or juridical French persons on [eight
listed] exterior public Bulgarian loans chargeable to former
Bulgarian governments."
Familiarly, "French persons" was to mean persons possessing French
nationality "A la date ou ces mesures ont 6t6 prises" and "i la date de
signature du present accord," at least as regards deprivation claims." 9
Likewise as before, all deprivation claimants were to be released com-
pletely from all manner of debts for which they may have been respons-
ible in Bulgaria. 6 ' And again, too, intergovernmental cooperation for the
processing of individual claims was expressly provided for.'
Significantly absent (and related to the last-mentioned familiar
element), however, was any clear-cut statement that responsibility for
152. Accord and Protocole d'Application Between France and Bulgaria of July 28,
1955 (Decree No. 59-361 of February 27, 1959), [1959] J.O. 2742 [hereinafter usually
referred to as the "Bulgarian Accord of 1955" or the "1955 Bulgarian Accord"].
153. Bulgarian Accord of 1955, art. 2.
154. Id. art. 1.
155. Id. art. 2(b); Protocole d'Application, art. 2, supra note 152. This levy was
to assist in compensating private and public debt claims, not deprivation claims.
156. Bulgarian Accord of 1955, arts. 4 and 5.
157. Id. art. 1(a), (b) and (c) (author's transl.).
158. While the "creeping expropriation" language here differs from the for-
mulations in the earlier settlements, its effect seems nonetheless the same. See notes
54 and 78 supra.
159. Bulgarian Accord of 1955, art. I(a). No equivalent requirement was specified
for the other two classes of claims covered.
160. Id. art. 5.
161. Id. arts. 2 and 3. See also Protocole d'Application, supra note 152.
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individual distribution would rest wholly with the French Government.' "e
One of two features that distinguished this settlement from the others
above noted, it suggests. perhaps, a special Bulgarian concern to maximize
control over what must have seemed a difficult political price to pay for
the restoration and maintenance of friendly commercial relations. Ac-
companying the principal accord, as noted, was a "Protocole d'Applica-
tion." This instrument, going beyond the usual explication of financial
details for the payment of deprivation claims, placed the most elaborate
conditions yet seen on French repartition of monies transferred for pay-
ment of public loan obligations.16 In short, the precaution given this item
-the degree of control conceded Bulgaria in the matter of distribution-
suggests that public debt claims may have been the central point of discord
between the two governments and, so, perhaps one of the more important
reasons, if not the main reason, for the delay in reaching settlement.
Bulgaria was concerned, obviously, to protect her economic base against
excessive creditor claims.
Which leads us, briefly and finally, to the second distinguishing fea-
ture of the Accord. The earlier settlements, it may be remembered, granted
compensation to creditor claimants for postwar deprivation damage, if
they did so at all, only by way of particularized enumeration. This was
not so here. Instead, all creditors, as well as all proprietors and
shareholders, affected by postwar Bulgarian deprivation measures were
deemed covered by this settlement." 4 To the extent that comprehensive-
ness is a virtue, surely this merits applause. But recognizing that this
meant equally the complete forfeiture of such claims by France in the fu-
ture, it must also be seen as indicative of hard bargaining on the part of
the Bulgarian Government. In any case, it is probably due mainly to this
provision that no further negotiations have been deemed necessary.
F. Tie Rumanian Settlement
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the Rumanian settlement,
last of the Eastern European settlements to be broached by France,
162. It was, however, implicit. See, in particular, Article 2(a) of the principal
accord.
163. Protocole d'Application, art. 4, supra note 152. In essence, France was given
three years and five years respectively, to submit provisional and definitive statements
of persons holding title to such loans then in circulation in France; if the justifying
evidence required to be submitted to Bulgaria by Article 3 of the principal accord showed
a value in these outstanding loans of less than 15,980 billion francs (the estimated total
value of these and related debts having been in the neighborhood of 17 billion francs),
then France would return to Bulgaria the balance paid and not so justified.
164. Bulgarian Accord of 1955, art. 5: "The indemnification provided for in the
present accord is to compensate the rights of natural and juridical French persons
affected, in their capacity as proprietor, shareholder, creditor, etc., by nationalizations
and other similar intervening measures in Bulgaria." (author's transl.).
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is the speed with which it was ratified by the French Government.
Comprised of a principal accord signed on February 8, 1959, with two
complementary protocols and three "6changes de lettres" of the same
date, 65 it was officially published on March 19, 1959. Looking back,
this was the shortest delay yet, demonstrating, perhaps, the needlessness
of other delays (as long as three and four years). Still, it was not until
1959 that a settlement between the two countries was in fact achieved.
Why this was so, considering the war damage, deprivation and other
claims outstanding, is again regrettably obscure.'66 But whatever the
reasons (likely as not they were the same as those inferred in the case of
Bulgaria), once again the settlement ultimately to be won was accom-
plished in one full sweep.
This was not the sole resemblance to the Bulgarian settlement,
however. On the contrary, the Rumanian settlement was in most essential
respects a near carbon copy of the Bulgarian. No two settlements, both
in language and intent, were more alike. Thus, consenting to a lump
sum indemnity (most of which was payable upon the entry into force of
the settlement)' 67 of the equivalent in French francs of twenty-one
million dollars' 6 ' (partly to facilitate "le dveloppement de leurs rela-
tions 6conomiques"),169 the two countries accepted as settled, defini-
tively and without recourse as usual,' the following familiar classes of
claims :..
(1) "the property, rights and interests of the French State and of
natural and juridical French persons affected by Rumanian
measures of nationalization, expropriation, requisition and
other similarly restrictive measures";
(2) "obligations due the French State and natural and juridical
French persons which devolve upon the Rumanian State pur-
suant to Articles 23 and 24 of the Treaty of Peace of February
10, 1947 between Rumania and the Allied and Associated
165. Accord Between France and Rumaina of February 8, 1959 (Decree No. 59-
439 of March 11, 1959), [1959] J.O. 3287 [hereinafter usually referred to as the
"Rumanian Accord of 1959" or the "1959 Rumanian Accord"]. The two "protocoles
d'applications" and the exchange of letters are published immediately following in the
Journal Of ficiel.
166. It is now known only that the negotiations were long and laborious. Sce
Jaudon, Rapport Moral, 36 AFFAIRS PTRANGRES B.1, B.11 (3rd Trim. 1959).
167. Rumanian Accord of 1959, art. 7.
168. Id. art. 1. The actual amount to be transferred to France, however, totalled
only 18,146,402 dollars. This figure was arrived at by levying against the 21 million
dollar indemnity the balance of payments due Rumania from France under a financial
protocol of December 24, 1954. See art. 5.
169. Id. preamble.
170. Id. arts. 2, 4 and 11.




(3) "obligations under loans described in Article 1st of the Proto-
cole d'Application No. 1 which forms an integral part of the
present accord."' 72
A fourth set of claims, obviously unique to this settlement, included
amounts due on "petroleum bonds issued by the Rumanian State pur-
suant to the [financial] accords of 30 September 1941 and 4 March
1943." 173
The likeness did not stop here, however. As before, though by an
exchange of letters rather than by the Accord proper, eligible "French
persons" were defined as persons possessing French nationality "i la
date ou les mesures restrictives . . . ont &6 prises" and "A la date de
signature de l'accord.""' 4 Likewise, all types of proprietor, shareholder
and creditor claimants (as well as the French State) were declared to be
both eligible for compensation and free from debt claims for which they
may have been liable in Rumania."" Standard, too, were the provisions
for intergovernmental cooperation in the processing of individual
claims."'.
It is in this last connection, indeed, that the two settlements bore
greatest resemblance. For probably the same reasons that likely pre-
dominated in the Bulgarian settlement, much space was again given to the
practical problems of turning over and distributing the indemnity agreed
upon. Such discretion as was allowed the French Government was sharp-
ly reduced-more so, even, than in the case of Bulgaria. Thus, in addi-
tion to detailing as before, but more precisely, (a) from whence the lump
sum payment would derive7 7 and (b) how and to what extent public obli-
gations would be redeemed,"' the Accord also detailed (as in the case of
Yugoslavia) how the global indemnity should be divided and distributed
172. These included (a) Rumanian State obligations issued in France or redeemable
outside Rumania and circulating in France, and (b) obligations circulating in France for
which Rumania had become responsible.
173. Rumanian Accord of 1959, art. 1 (d) (author's transl.).
174. Exchange of Letters No. 1, supra note 165. This criterion was applicable only
to deprivation claims. Bondholders were required to have French nationality as of the date
of the settlement. See Protocole d'Application No. 1, art. 1, szupra note 165.
175. Rumanian Accord of 1959, art. 3.
176. Id. art. 13. See also in this connection the provisions of the two protocols
relating to the means and allocation of payments. Supra note 165.
177. I.e., from a French balance of payments due Rumania under a financial
protocol of 1954, from Rumanian gold, currency and francs on deposit in France to
service Rumania's external debt, from French-blocked Rumanian deposits in France,
from a direct payment of the equivalent in French francs of one million dollars, from
an eight percent levy on Rumanian exports to France, and from additional existing
Rumanian currency and franc deposits in France that by later agreement would be
judged available. Id. arts. 7 and 9.
178. See generally Protocole dApplication No. 1, supra note 165.
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to the various French claimants.'79 For its participation in former
Rumanian companies and its title to Rumanian petroleum bonds, the
Tr6sor Public would be entitled to three percent of the indemnity.
Thirty-seven percent was to be allocated to French persons who held war
damage and postwar deprivation claims. And the balance, sixty percent,
was to go to the French holders of the Rumanian obligations enumerated
in the "Protocole d'Application" No. 1. Whatever discretion remained as
to final repartition would be within the sole competence of the French
Government. 8 '
G. Conclusions
What, then, can be drawn from this brief description of French
lump sum settlements with Eastern Europe? Obviously, no more than a
truncated review will allow. Definitive judgments must necessarily await
further and more detailed research. 8' Nevertheless, several tentative
conclusions can be ventured.
To begin with, all the settlements were compelled to be responsive to
the economic vicissitudes of their day. This is seen in two principal ways.
First, subject to the extent to which it has been so far possible to
document, none approached what might be called "full compensation,"
i.e., full market value as of the time of loss or some other relevant time.
While surely due to the inaccessibility of relevant information and to a
desire to avoid the hard and potentially disruptive routine of line-by-line
evaluation, it must also be said that the postwar financial crises which
confronted Eastern Europe and the comprehensive economic reforms
that it pursued quite simply curbed its ability to pay. Second, probably
none of the settlements, as inadequate as they may have seemed to the
French, could have been achieved without the French accepting "value-
tying" arrangements. The restoration of productive commercial rela-
tions with France (and the rest of Western Europe and America) was es-
sential to Eastern European economic growth. Without these arrange-
ments, the quantum of indemnity obtained, if not the very settlements
themselves, would likely have proved impossible, at least for a long time.
Next, and notwithstanding such economic conditioning factors as
these or the "juri-political" perspectives that compelled resort to the lump
sum settlement device, all the settlements seem to have affirmed at least
179. Rumanian Accord of 1959, art. 11.
180. Id.
181. A study of the lump stun settlement process is a current major project of
the Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute. The final product, to be published
in 1970, will be a treatise entitled INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY
LUmP Sum AGREEMENTS. Working on this project, besides the author, is Professor
Richard B. Lillich, Naval War College (and Director of the Procedural Aspects of In-
ternational Law Institute).
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the principle if not the precise quantum of compensation for both the di-
rect and indirect deprivation of foreign wealth in international law. The
socialist and sometimes Third World counter-argument that these settle-
ments, far from evincing a rule of compensation, represent no more than
a voluntary concession to economic expediency is of course not to be ig-
nored. But if we understand, as we should, that international law, like all
law, is not simply a matter of "rules" from which parochial dissent can
be had at will, but, rather, a special and oftentimes hazy mix of formal
authority and effective control, and if we understand further that in our
essentially horizontal world (as on occasion in our domestic orders) the
matter of control is usually reduced to socio-economic and political pres-
sures ("sanctions") of one sort or another, then the counter-argument
must fail. A realistic appreciation of any system of law, or authoritative
decision process, simply cannot be had without, first, a correct identifi-
cation of the precise system itself and, second, a proper understanding of
the real world variables from which it gains its lifeblood. Were the
French experience unique, which it is not,182 then, obviously, other con-
clusions might have to be drawn. But the emphasis, be it noted, is condi-
tional and not absolute because, even then, the conditions of progress up-
on which major community-wide goals or policies depend must still be
clarified and taken into account.
Finally, as time went on, the settlements negotiated between France
and Eastern Europe tended to gain not only more verbal clarity, but
also both increased claims coverage and greater detail as to the treatment
to be accorded the claims covered. These considerations surely are
interesting in their own right. But considering that the final distribution
of the indemnities transferred was to rest to a greater or lesser degree
with the French Government, they have more than historical significance.
This is so in at least two related respects. First, they were probably to
shape fundamentally the distribution programs that were ultimately to
be carried out. The Polish Accord of 1948, for example, was restricted
to the indemnification of French persons injured only by Polish nation-
alization and like measures. The 1959 Rumanian Accord, on the other
hand, went far beyond this-to indemnify French persons for all kinds of
outstanding financial claims (including nationalization claims). Obvious-
ly, these differences were likely to structure the horizons, and so to influ-
ence the very character, of each claims distribution program. Second,
they were inevitably and variously to qualify the substantive, or juris-
182. See Dawson & Weston, "Prompt, Adequate and Effective": A Universal
Standard of Compensation?, 30 FORDHAM L. Rxv. 727 (1962). See also Lillich,
International Clains: Their Settlement by Lump Sum Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL
AIWITRATIoN-LBER AIcoRum FOR MARTIN DomxE at 143, 147-48 (P.Sanders ed. 1967).
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prudential, decisions that needed finally to be rendered under each pro-
gram. The point is obvious. Not free to distribute the indemnities trans-
ferred at will, the French Government was required, if only in fairness
to the many claimants involved, to apply as internal law the provisions of
each accord to which it was a party. 8  As they varied in coverage and
precision, so would the substantive decisions rendered pursuant to them
differ from program to program.
III. THE REPARTITION PROCESS
We come, then, to the last half of the lump sum settlement-national
claims commission device as employed by France since World War II.
This is the principal concern of the larger study which this essay
anticipates. Leaving to that larger effort the presentation and analysis
of the jurisprudence developed under each repartition (or distribution)
program, we may here consider, as precisely as presently available data
will allow, the forms and procedures that these programs assumed.
As indicated, a number of factors compelled France to choose the
national claims commission device for distributing Eastern European
settlement funds during the postwar period."" It would only be redun-
dant to repeat them here. Two other preliminaries remain, however.
First, and perhaps most important to the comparativists, France did
not follow the equivalent patterns that prevailed in the United Kingdom
and the United States. 5 Unlike those countries, each of which
created but one commission to dispose of all their lump sum settlements
(in the United States, the International Claims Commission of 1950
and its successor, the existing Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of
1954; in Great Britain, the Foreign Compensation Commission of 1950),
France elected to establish several such commissions ("commissions de
repartitions")-one for each Eastern European settlement. Why this
path was chosen is not altogether clear. However, two reasons, neither
wholly persuasive, have been given to this writer :18 first, the sub-
stantive differences that distinguished the separate settlements and,
second, the multiplicity of claims under each settlement and the consequent
concern to simplify (presumably, to render more efficacious) the pro-
cessing of the individual claims involved. There is no doubt that these
183. Consider THE FRENCH CONSTITUTION OF 1958, art. 55 (French Embassy
English transl.): "Treaties or agreements duly ratified or approved shall, upon their
publication, have an authority superior to that of laws, subject, for each agreement or
treaty, to its application by the other party."
184. See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
185. As to these equivalent patterns, see R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS:
POSTWAR BRITISH PRACTICE (1967) ; . LiLLicH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS THEIR ADJUDI-
CATION iY NATIONAL COMIISSIONS (1962).
186. See Glaser Correspondence-12/67, note 13.
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considerations were present. But a more satisfying answer, since both
the United States and the United Kingdom had opted for the single
commission before even the first French commission was constituted,
is that the French experience simply grew like Topsy, responding ad hoc
to events as they arose.'87 Perhaps over the long haul this multiple
approach has had little bearing on such matters as legislative-adminis-
trative efficiency, decisional consistency and other related issues.'
The institutional environment within which the commissions have oper-
ated has of itself provided some degree of harmonization. Nevertheless,
the multiple approach has not escaped the criticism of some French
observers." 9
Second, while separate conunissions were established to handle each
settlement, the French did not create separate commissions for each
settlement accord. Only the Bulgarian and Rumanian settlements, it will
be recalled, were won through a single (though admittedly protracted)
negotiation. Limited to these settlements, the observation obviously
fails. But it may also be remembered that all the other settlements-
the Polish, the Czech, the Hungarian and the Yugoslav-were defini-
tively achieved only after two or more distinct negotiations. Ac-
cepting arguendo the rationale given for resort to multiple com-
missions, it seems logical that France would have constituted a sep-
arate commission for each of these many claims agreements as well.
Wisely, however, if only for administrative efficiency, the French Par-
liament chose not to be this consistent. Demonstrating faith in the
efficacy of the separate distribution programs already under way, it
simply charged the Polish, Czech, Hungarian and Yugoslav commis-
sions earlier constituted with the responsibility of applying the respective
"international legislation" that was newly, and generally later, pre-
scribed.' In short, only six commissions have been formed.Ya
187. See G. VIENOT, NATIONALISATIONS frTRANGtRES ET INTPRETS FRANCAIS 229
(1953).
188. See Ernest-Picard Correspondence-11/67, supra note 15, which suggests
that it has created few, if any, difficulties of this kind.
189. See LaPradelle, Juridiction Administrative et Droit International, 1962 PTTjDES
nr DOCUItENTS (Conseil d'tat) 13, 39; 0. MoREAU-NtRET, VALEURS tTRANGARES,
MOUVEMENTS DE CAPITAUX ENTRE LA FRANCE ET L'TRANGER DEPuIS 1940, at 165
(1956) ; G. ViENoT, supra note 187, at 229-30.
190. See, e.g., Decree of March 28, 1958, [1959] J.0. 3301 (assigning responsibility
for the 1951 Polish Accord to the Polish Commission established on May 24, 1951);
"Avis" of July 22, 1964, [1964] J.0. 6505 (assigning responsibility for the 1963 Yugoslav
Accord to the Yugoslav Commission established on July 21, 1952); "Avis" of March
3, 1966, [1966] J.0. 1841 (assigning responsibility for the 1965 Hungarian Accord to
the Hungarian Commission established on May 24, 1951).
190a. Since the drafting of this essay, the author has learned of two significant
qualifications to this statement. The first is Decree No. 67-854 of September 20, 1967,
[1967] J.0. 9762, by which the Polish Commission, its original work completed but it-
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With these general observations in mind, consider now the legis-
lation by which the six "commissions de rep~rtitions"'' were established
and the rules of internal procedure which they were to follow.
A. The Enabling Legislation
The Polish, Czech and Hungarian commissions, created at virtu-
ally the same time, were identical in character; subject to obvious
necessary differences, the legislation pursuant to which they were found-
ed (i.e., the constitutive and the applicative laws) were the same-nearly
word for word.'92 Partly because of this, but mainly because this legisla-
tion served as the model for creating the three later commissions, it merits
detailed treatment. Using as our guide the legislation enabling the estab-
lishment of the Czech Commission (it was unencumbered by the special
coal transfer provisions which conditioned the equivalent Polish Com-
mission legislation), we can later note the minor variations on the basic
theme.
1. The Basic Theme
The law constituting the Czech Commission is representative, con-
cise and straightforward. Accordingly, clarity and economy dictate quot-
ing its key features in full,' making appropriate notes along the way.
Art. 2.-In view of the execution [of the] Accord [of
1950] ... and by application of its Article 7 [i.e., the provision
placing sole responsibility for individual repartition in the hands
of the French Government], there is established une com-
mission spdciale composed as follows:
self still constituted, was charged with distributing funds being transferred under the
Franco-Cuban Convention of March 16, 1967 (see note 36 supra). The second is Decree
No. 68-103 of January 30, 1968, [1968] J.0. 1228, establishing a new commission spiciale
to distribute sums presaged and promised by the agreements between France and the
United Arab Republic of August 22, 1958 and July 28, 1966 (see notes 18 and 36 supra).
As yet, however, neither of these commissions has adjudicated any claims, although the
"Cuban Commission" has gone so far as to formulate its internal Rules of Procedure
(copies of which are available at Le Secretariat de la Commission de Ripartition
Cubaine, 80, Rue de Lille, Paris 7e).
191. Herein called "the Polish Commission," "the Czech Commission," 'the Hun-
garian Commission," "the Yugoslav Commission," "the Bulgarian Commission" and
"the Rumanian Commission."
192. See Law No. 51-671 of May 24, 1951 (constituting the commission to
distribute sums transferred under the 1950 Czech Accord), [1951] J.0. 5787, and
Application of Law No. 51-671 (Aug. 4, 1952), [19521 J.0. 8428; Law No. 51-673
of May 24, 1951 (constituting the commission to distribute sums transferred under the
1948 Polish Accord), [1951] J.0. 5788, and Application of Law No. 51-673 (May 13,
1952), [1952] J.0. 4862; Law No. 51-674 of May 24, 1951 (constituting the commission
to distribute sums transferred under the 1950 Hungarian Accord), [1951] 3.0. 5789,
and Application of Law No. 51-674 (Aug. 4, 1952), [1952] J.0. 8428.
193. Author's translation follows.
POSTWAR FRENCH CLAIMS
A president de chambre at the cour de cassation, President,
and a conseiller at the cour de cassation, both designated by
the First President of the cour de cassation;
A conseiller d'Etat, active or honorary, designated by the
garde des sceaux [i.e., the keeper of the seals] ;
A conseiller maitre at the cour des comptes, active or hon-
orary, designated by the Minister of Finance;
An official designated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 9 "
Art. 3.-The claimants... shall, at risk of forfeiture and
no later than three months after the promulgation of the pre-
sent law, except in case of force majeur, present their claims
to the commission spiciale established at Article 2 above.'95
Equally admissible are:
a) Claims presented by associations constituted or capable
of being constituted . . . to represent natural or juridical
French persons having participation, even minority participa-
tion, in companies that are neither French nor under French
control 19
b) Claims drawn up on behalf and in place of a company
by the shareholders of French companies or of companies under
French control, if they are presented within the time allowed
above and if the company is not itself appealing.
Art. 4.-Assignments of assets by natural or juridical
persons to the German State or to its nationals remain annulled
by virtue of Ordinance No. 1224 of 9 June 1945. Amounts
collected for these assignments shall be turned over to the
Treasury. 9
194. Vienot comments upon the composition of the commissions as follows: "By
the quality of their members and by the variety of the Agencies to which the members
belong, the Commissions constitute colIcges perfectly adapted to the tasks which are
theirs. The multiple problems of the juridical, administrative, diplomatic and financial
orders are easily solved by these highly competent personalities." Supra note 187, at 230
(author's transl.).
195. As it turned out, this time requirement proved impossibly short in all cases.
Accordingly, the French Parliament subsequently granted eighteen month extensions.
196. It may be noted that, unlike the 1948 Polish Accord, neither the 1950 Czech
Accord nor the 1950 Hungarian Accord expressly mentioned minority shareholders.
197. This provision and its related clauses throughout the law were designed to
penalize those who, through property transfers, profited from the Germans during the
German occupation or control of Czechoslovakia (and Poland and Hungary) during
World War II. Since there was no mention of this item in the relevant accords, the
provision is illustrative of the prerogative role of the French Government in the
repartition process. For details concerning this anti-collaboration provision, see Sarraute
& Tager, Les effets en France des nationalisations itrang~res, 79 Jou1wAL iU DROIT
INTMRNATIONAL 1138, 1173-77 (1952) ; G. VmNoT, supra note 187, at 241-43.
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Art. 5.-The commission sp9ciale shall:
Draw up a definitive list of distributees;
Rule souverainement on the merits of the claims and on
the value of the debts or the nationalized property that belonged
to the distributees ;..
Determine the distributees' share of the [lump sum]
indemnity.
The commission spdciale shall, judging in equity, charge
to the distributions allowed a deduction which takes into account
the use value of the amounts collected by property owners
who assigned their property to the [German] State or to
German nationals; it must equally take into account the revalori-
zation of investments made by the assignors with the amounts
collected.'99
Art. 6.-The administrative costs of the commission
spiciale and its secretariat shall be charged to the sum total
of the indemnitg globale foraitaire.
Art. 7.-The commission shall terminate the examination
of claims and render the decisions relative thereto within eigh-
teen months of the promulgation of the present law."'0
Art. 8.-Appropriate measures to assure the execution
of the Accord . . . and of the present law will be taken by
joint decision of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the
Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs.
The Czech "application" law was equally concise and to the point.
Again, subject to appropriate passing notations, the key language bears
198. The thrust of this provision was to deny judicial review. See text accompanying
notes 207-13 in-fra. In this connection, it should be noted that the word "souverainement"
was not included in the Hungarian constitutive law. But as Sarraute and Tager have
remarked (supra note 197, at 1177), "this is probably a mere oversight"
199. For the significance of this provision, see note 197 supra. It should also be
mentioned that the direction to judge in equity relates only to the valuation of the
claims of persons who, by constraint or otherwise, transferred property to the German
authorities during World War II. None of the enabling legislation, either in its basic
theme or its subsequent variations, otherwise stipulated any system of law (domestic or
international) to which commission decisions should refer.
200. As the time requirement for presenting claims proved too short, so did the
time allotted for rendering decisions. Here, too, the French Parliament subsequently
granted eighteen month extensions.
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quotation in full :20.
Art. 1-The commission sp&iale [previously constituted]
shall undertake all measures relative to its functioning. It shall
regulate its own procedure. It may select rapporteurs and
seek expert advice.2"' Its secretariat shall be guaranteed by
the office des biens et intrets privis where it has its head-
quarters. -o2 a
It shall report periodically on the state of its work to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, direction ginirale des affaires
cconouziques et financiers, and to the Minister of Finance,
direction des finances exterieures.
Art. 2.-The director of the office des biens et intirets
prives or his representative shall function as commissaire du
gouvernement to the commission."'
Art. 3-Responsibility for the payments made by the
Czech Government pursuant to the Accord shall be assumed
by the agent comptable [i.e., accountant] of the foreign assets
of the Treasury.
Art. 4.-The commission spbciale shall notify the account-
201. Author's translation follows.
202. See Socifti anonyme de l'industrie textile, [1964] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 360, where-
in the Conseil d' tat held that it was material error for the Polish Commission to base a
valuation decision on erroneous expert advice.
202a. Since the preparation of this essay, the author has learned that, since 1953,
the French Foreign M~inistry's Office des Biens et Intgr~ts Prives has been known as the
Service des Biens et Intfrits Privds. While noting this may seem pedantic, it nonetheless
deserves mention because it represents not only a change in bureaucratic structure but,
more important, an elevation in the administrative hierarchy.
203. Insofar as the Eastern European commissions are concerned, the functions of
director and cominissaire have recently come to be performed by two different individuals.
In any case, the principal role of the commissaire du gouves-nement is to act in an adver-
sarial capacity before the commissions on behalf of the claimants involved. In this
capacity he performs an important integrative, or harmonizing, function among the six
commissions. See Glaser Correspondence--12/67, supra note 13. For further details, see
text accompanying notes 239-41 infra. It should be mentioned also that the role of the
commissaire du gouvernement has been several times considered by the Conseil d' Ttat.
See, e.g., Commissaire du gouvernement prds de la Comission de riparlition de
l'indemnitj des nationalisations, [1960] REv. PRATIQUE DE DROIT ADaSINIsTRATIF, No. 16,
wherein the Conseil stated that the Commissaire "ought to be regarded as having for
his mission a watchdog function, in the interest of all the claimants . . . who could not
be called upon in each particular instance [and who otherwise] would be wholly deprived
of recourse in respect to the rules posed by the law. . . ." (author's transl.) As to the
similar roles of the Legal Officer of the British Foreign Compensation Commission and
the erstwhile Solicitor of the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission,
see R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: POSTWAR BRITISH PRAcTIcE 13-14 (1967);
Lillich, International Claims: A Comparative Study of American and British Postwar
Pvactice, 39 IND. L.J. 465, 473-74 (1964).
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ant of the foreign assets of the Treasury of its repartition
decisions.
The commission spiciale, according to the progress of its
work, may decide to grant [repartition] installments before
determining definitively the repartition due all distributees.
Art. 5.-.. . [T]he sums necessary to the functioning of
the commission shall be charged against the sum total of the
indemnitg globale forfaitaire by the accountant of the foreign
assets of the Treasury in accordance with the decisions of
the commission and the conditions stipulated by its president.
Specifically included in the operating costs shall be the
salaries of the members of the commission, the sum total of
which shall be fixed by decision of the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, the Minister of Finance and the minister in charge of
the budget, and the fees of the rapporteurs and the experts, the
sum total of which shall be fixed by the President of the Com-
mission upon approval of the minister in charge of the budget.
Thus the basic theme. Before proceeding to its three later varia-
tions, however, thoroughness and accuracy compel our noting how it
came to be formulated and in what manner it was itself significantly
modified.
In the first place, it was, in the beginning, by no means self-evident
exactly what form the French repartition program should take. That it
should be neither strictly "judicial" nor strictly "administrative" in
character, i.e., that it should partake in some way of "la notion
d'arbitrage, '  was generally accepted. But it cannot be overlooked
that it was not until May 1951, nearly three full years after the first
lump sum agreement (the Polish Accord of 1948) received French
presidential ratification, that the first three commissions were founded.
Add to this that two other lump sum agreements, the Czech and Hun-
garian Accords of 1950, were negotiated in the interim and surely it is
apparent that, from the start, the French had no firm views about how
distribution should proceed. Indeed, it is not even necessary to look to
this sequence of events. 5 to prove the point. Expressly corroborative
is the French Foreign Ministry Decree of August 31, 1950 which, with
reference to the 1948 Polish Accord (already more than eighteen months
old), established a three-man "commission administrative d'6tudes" to
consider the arrangements necessary for indemnifying eligible claim-
204. G. VIENOT, supra note 187, at 229.




The final result of these efforts was, of course, the basic theme
mentioned above. It remained, on the whole, remarkably constant, even
when accounting for the variations that were to be instituted with the
last three commissions. One major revision, however, one which took
place before the establishment of the last two commissions (the Bulgarian
and the Rumanian) though after and related to the creation of the
fourth (the Yugoslav Commission), concerned the question of judicial
review.
The basic theme, it will be recalled, expressly stipulated that the
commissions spdiales should rule "souverainement" on the merits and
the value of the individual claims presented. °7 Practically speaking, this
was understood to mean that commission decisions would not be subject
to judicial review. As Sarraute and Tager (avocats at the Cour d'Appel
of Paris) wrote of this in 1952, "[t]he organism [i.e., the commission]
... created appears to be one for arbitration, without any administrative
powers, and one whose decisions do not seem to be subject to review by
the Conseil d'P-tat. '2 ° In any event, what was considered likely in 1952
was made absolutely clear in 1955 when the Conseil d'Atat itself, in a
case arising out of a Yugoslav Commission decision, had occasion to
affirm this principle of non-review."' The ruling caused not a little
stir, 2 " and in December 1956 the French Parliament passed a law of
"un caract~re interpr~tatif" which, in effect, reversed the Conseil
d'Rtat"' Henceforth, the decisions of the Polish, Czech, Hungarian
and Yugoslav commissions would be "susceptible to no means of redress
other than redress en cassation before the Conseil d'ftat."2  The effect
of this law was to be seen not only in the heightened involvement of
the Conseil thereafter," 8 but also in the legislation by which the Bulgarian
and Rumanian commissions were subsequently established.
206. See Decree of August 31, 1950, [1950] J.0. 10088.
207. See text accompanying note 198 s=pra.
208. Supra note 197, at 1179. Cf. Duez, Les actes de Gonvorneinent, 1953 J.
DROrT INT'L. 54, 66-67.
209. Epoux Deltel, [1956] D. S. Jur. 44.
210. See, e.g., Rousseau, Notes de Jurisprudence, 1956 Rv. DRoi PuB. ScI.
POL. 150; Sialelli, Chroniquw de Jisprudence, 1956 J. D oiT IN'L. 674.
211. Law No. 56-1251 of December 11, 1956, [1956] J.0. 11871.
212. Id. art. 1. By Article 2 the Conseil d'Atat was given a six-month period for-
rehearings. The Deltel case was subsequently reconsidered on the merits. See Dame
veuve Deltel, [1957] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 512.
213. Since being granted the right of judicial review over commission decisions,
the Conseil d'Petat has left virtually nothing untouched. As a consequence, its decisions
have played an important role in setting jurisprudential guidelines for commission rulings.
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2. The Minor Variations
(a) The Yugoslav Commission
The law constituting the Yugoslav Commission was passed by the
French Parliament in July 1952, over sixteen months after the 1951
Yugoslav Accord.21 Its companion "application" law was decreed three
months later, in October 1952.215 The latter, except for the obvious
necessary changes, was identical in wording to its Polish, Czech and
Hungarian counterparts. The former, on the other hand, though rhetoric-
ally close to its predecessors, evinced several noteworthy revisions (ap-
plicable, of course, to the Yugoslav Commission only).
First, composition."' While before only a president of a chambre at
the Cour de Cassation could be President of the commissions, now either
this person or a president of a section at the Conseil d'etat could fill that
chair. Also, while before the Commission President and a conseiller at the
Cour de Cassation were named by the First President of the Cour de Cas-
sation, now these members were to be designated by the garde des sceaux,
i.e., the keeper of the seals. Further, all five members of the Commission,
rather than only two (as before), could be chosen from the active and
inactive ranks of magistrats and fonctionnaires.
Second, the due date for filing claims."' Previously, claimants were
allowed three months from the promulgation of the constitutive law to
file their claims with the commissions. In this instance, subject to the
same reservation of force ma]eur, they were given three months from the
publication of the "'application" decree.21
Third, "'receivable" claims.2"' The following additional claims were
deemed admissible: "claims presented in the name of the [French] State
when it has exercised its right of assignment within the conditions set
forth in Article 3 of the Ordinance of 9 June 1945."2'o
Fourth, the duties of the Commission.22" ' The functions were here
stated to be the same as before except that the Commission was now to
"pronounce itself" rather than "rule souverainement" on the claims pre-
sented. In light of the foregoing discussion, 2' this at first seems a major
214. Law No. 52-861 of July 21, 1952, [1952] J.O. 7362.
215. Application of Law No. 52-861 (October 29, 1952), [1952] 3.O. 11158.
216. Supra note 214, art. 2.
217. Id. art. 3.
218. This was probably a reflection of the difficulties that resulted from the pro-
mulgation of the earlier application laws more than three months after the promulgation
of their companion constitutive laws.
219. Supra note 214, art. 3.
220. For the relevance of the 1945 Ordinance to these claims, see note 197 stpra
and authorities cited therein.
221. Supra note 214, art. 5
222. See text accompanying notes 207-13 mtpra.
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change. However, an additional duty was added which had the same
general, if not as sweeping, effect as before: the Commission was now
to "fix its own procedure and rule souverainement."228
Finally, the due date for rendering decisions.224 As before, the Com-
mission was required to render decisions within eighteen months. How-
ever, that period was now to commence as of the publication of the "ap-
plication" decree rather than as of the promulgation of the constitutive
law. Obviously, this was to coincide with the new due date required
for the filing of claims.225
(b) The Bulgarian and Rumanian Commissions
Though the Bulgarian and Rumanian settlements were more than
four years apart, these last two commissions were established at the
same time. Likely as not it is for this reason (and probably also because
of the likeness of the two settlements) that their enabling laws were,
with insignificant though necessary exception, identical in all respects. It
is thus obviously convenient to treat them jointly.
Consider, initially, their constitutive legislation.22 Significantly,
this differed only slightly from the Yugoslav equivalent. First, all but
two of the variations introduced in the Yugoslav Commission con-
stitutive law were incorporated here. The two exceptions concerned the
due dates for filing claims and rendering decisions. While in the case of
the Yugoslav Commission these dates were keyed to the publication of
the "application" decree, for the Bulgarian and Rumanian commissions
they were keyed to the promulgation of the constitutive law.22 This
was, of course, a reversion to the basic theme, a retreat which is per-
plexing considering the time extensions that had previously proven
necessary.28 Second, in adding two provisions not found in the Yugoslav
Commission constitutive law, the Bulgarian and Rumanian equivalents
only made express what was by now in the Yugoslav (and other) repar-
tition programs already present in practice. The first, requiring that the
director of the Office des Biens et Intr~ts Priv6s or his representative
223. Perhaps, indeed, it was because this item was singled out for special separate
mention that it became a major issue for the spouses Deltel. See text accompanying
notes 207-13 supra. It may also be noted that the direction here to the Commission to
"fix its own procedure" was also new, even though it was repeated in the Yugoslav
application law.
224. Supra note 214, art. 6.
225. Still, it is surprising that the eighteen month period was adhered to, con-
sidering the extensions that had been required before. See note 195 supra.
226. Decree No. 59-1116 of September 19, 1959 (constituting the Bulgarian
Commission), [1959] J.0. 9348; Decree No. 59-1117 of September 19, 1959 (con-
stituting the Rumanian Commission), [1959] J.0. 9348.
227. Id. arts. 2 and 5 (in both decrees).
228. See note 195 supra.
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be the commissaire du gouvernement to the commissions,"' had pre-
viously been prescribed in the "application" laws. The second, providing
that Bulgarian and Rumanian commission decisions be "susceptible to
no means of redress other than redress en cassation before the Conseil
d'Rtat, ' ' had been earlier required, as explained above, by special
enactment of the French Parliament.
The Bulgarian and Rumanian commission "application" decrees,
lastlr, did differ somewhat from their prior counterparts.28' But only in-
consequentially. Mainly the variations were formalistic, reflecting more
the need for consistency with the companion constitutive laws (and to a
lesser extent with Fifth Republic institutional changes) than anything
else. 232
Such, then, were the minor variations. It is the fact that they were
minor, indeed, that is significant. All the commissions, from first to last,
were fashioned in the same basic mold. In a sense this seems surprising,
considering the differences in the settlements to which the commissions
were a response. Partly, of course, this suggests a continued satisfaction
on the part of French officials with the repartition scheme initially
devised. But also, and perhaps more importantly, it allows the inference
that the settlement differences, since they influenced but little the organi-
zational structure of the French repartition process, were to have their
primary impact (if any) upon the legal structure, or decisional outcomes,
of this process. These, as indicated, must await later study.
B. The Rules of Procedure
As seen, the six commissions were instructed to formulate for
themselves their own rules of internal procedure. This they all did, 88
twice in the cases of the Hungarian and Yugoslav commissions." 4 Sig-
nificantly, all these riglements de proc~dure are very much alike-if not
229. Supra note 226, art. 1 (in both decrees).
230. Id. art. 3 (in both decrees).
231. Decree of March 10, 1960 (applying Bulgarian Commission constitutive
Decree No. 59-1116), [1960] J.0. 2808; Decree of March 10, 1960 (applying Rumanian
Commission constitutive Decree No. 59-1117), [1960] J.0. 2809.232. For example, these decrees contained no direction to the commissions to fix
their own procedures. Nor did they provide for a commissaire du gouvernentent. Both
of these matters were dealt with in the constitutive decrees.
233. See Polish Commission Rules of Procedure, 9 AFFAIRES tTRANGkRES E.1 (July
1952) ; Czech Commission Rules of Procedure, 12 AFFAIRES ATRANGtRES F.1 (2nd Trim.
1953) ; first and second Hungarian Commission Rules of Procedure (unpublished mimeo.,
copies available at Le Secretariat de la Commission de R6partition Hungroise, 31, Rue
Dumont d'Urville, Paris 16e) ; first and second Yugoslav Commission Rules of Procedure
(unpublished mimeo., copies available at Le Secretariat de ]a Commission de R~partition
Yougoslave, 80, Rue de Lille, Paris 7e); Rumanian Commission Rules of Procedure,
"Avis" of December 19, 1959, [1959] J.0. 12110; Bulgarian Commission Rules of Pro-




always to the letter, at least in spirit. The Polish and Czech commission
Rules, for example, are virtually identical. So too are the Rules that
were created for the Bulgarian and Rumanian commissions. In short,
such variations as are to be found among the eight sets of Rules formu-
lated are, by and large, minor in character, requiring us, when finding
differences between them, to avoid exalting form over substance. Since
they were mainly refinements of basically similar enabling, laws, it is
natural that they should also have been relatively uniform.
All the separate Rules have been divided into three main Titles
("Titres") : prdsentation de la demande, instruction de la demande and
examen de la demande (in the Rules of the Polish, Czech, and Yugoslav
commissions, and also in the first set of Hungarian Commission Rules)
or jugement de la demande (in the Rules of the Bulgarian and Rumanian
commissions, and also in the second set of Hungarian Commission Rules).
It is convenient to review them summarily in that order, pointing out the
principal differences and other pertinent matters along the way.
1. Presentation of the Claim2 5
All claims have had to be filed by the claimant, his legal representa-
tive or an authorized proxy at the main offices of the commissions with-
in the time limits set forth in the relevant enabling laws. Persons living
abroad with claims to present to the Bulgarian, Hungarian and Rumanian
commissions have also been entitled to file, optionally, with a French
consulate, legation or embassy in the country where they are residing.
While the Rules have required no special forms, nevertheless all the peti-
tions have had to be reasoned ("motive"), dated and signed, stating the
facts that arguably justify indemnification and the specific amount of dam-
age sustained. If a natural person, the claimant has had also to state his
name, profession (except before the Bulgarian, Rumanian and latter-day
Hungarian commissions), domicile and nationality; if a juridical person,
the name of the firm, its "si~ge," nationality and legal representative.
Further, all petitions have had to be supported by annexed documents,
written in French, prepared in duplicate and, for the Polish, Czech and
Yugoslav commissions, inventoried, each establishing (a) the claimant's
French nationality on the date or dates specified in the relevant accord,
and (b) the merits of the claim itself. Before the Polish, Czech and Yu-
goslav commissions, supporting individual testimony has had to be in the
form of a written declaration, dated and bearing the legal signature of
235. See Polish, Czech and first Yugoslav commission Rules, supra note 233, arts.
1-11, first Hungarian Commission Rules, supra note 233, arts. 1-10; second Yugoslav
Commission Rules, supra note 233, arts. 1-8; Bulgarian, Rumanian and second Hungarian
commission Rules, supra note 233, arts. 1-5.
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the witness or declarant. Upon deposit, all these materials, representing
a "dossier," have had to be "registered" by the secretary of each commis-
sion who, in turn, has had to deliver to the claimant a receipt therefor,
together with the duplicate set of supporting documents previously pre-
pared and submitted by the claimant.
2. Preliminary Examination of the Claim..
When the preliminary examination is to begin and end is not stated
in the Rules. Presumably the commissions have operated in their own
discretion, subject, of course, to the eighteen month limitations specified
in their enabling laws. At any rate, upon commencement, the President
of each commission has had to name for each "af faire" or series of "af-
faires" of like nature a rapporteur taken from among the members of the
commissions or from a list established by the commissions. Once desig-
nated, the rapporteur has been required to proceed to a preliminary ex-
amination of the claim or claims involved. To this end, he has been free
to require the claimant to produce, at the risk of being passed over, all
manner of information and supporting documentation that he might
deem necessary. Likewise, he has been authorized to seek such independ-
ent research and verification as may be needed."'r If in his judgment it
is necessary to have expert testimony, he has had to so inform the com-
mission which, in turn, would proceed to obtain it. Once finished with
his preliminary examination, the rapporteur has had to prepare a written
"rapport" for annexation to the "dossier" (at least under the Polish,
Czech and Hungarian commission Rules) and for communication to the
commissaire du gouvernement whose right it then has been to require the
rapporteur to complete such information or obtain such additional expert
testimony as the commissaire may deem appropriate. This done, the
commissaire (who, it will be recalled, acts on behalf of the claimants)
has had to prepare his "conclusions" (findings) and transmit the "dos-
sier" to the President of the commission."' Together, the "rapport" of
236. See Polish, Czech and first Yugoslav commission Rides, supra note 233, arts.
12-14; First Hungarian Commission Rules, supra note 233, arts. 11-13; second Yugoslav
Commission Rules, supra note 233, arts. 9-11; Bulgarian, Rumanian and second Hun-
garian commission Rules, supra note 233, arts. 6-8.
237. According to the Conseil d'.tat, in a case arising out of the Yugoslav
Commission, it was not necessary for the Yugoslav Commission, assuming no legislative
rulings to the contrary, to advise a claimant of diverse documents requested by it or
-voluntarily transmitted to it 'by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the absence of a
formal demand 'by the claimant, the Commission had complete discretion in this regard.
Sieur Campion, [1960] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 30.
238. In the case of Sieur Lambert et autres, [1963] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 511, on appeal
frbm the Rumanian Commission, the Conseil d'etat held that, in order to assure the
adversarial character of commission proceedings, the written "conclusions" must be
communicated to the claimant before the Commission rules on the claim, and, failing
that, the Commission's ruling was reversible.
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the rapporteur and the "conclusions" of the commissaire du gouvernement
have served as the principal adversarial documents upon which the com-
missions have based their rulings.
3. Final Examination (or Judgment) of the Claim239
At the outset, the President of each commission has had to fix the
date for commission deliberation of the claim(s). To proceed, a quorum
of at least three of the five commission members has been required. None
of the Rules states, however, whether and at what point commissioners not
initially sitting might join in the deliberations or whether and at what
point such commissioners might replace others who, for one reason or
another, cannot attend."' But other organizational matters are quite
clearly detailed. Thus, commission sessions have not been allowed to be
public; the commissaire du gouvernernent, the secretary of each commis-
sion (at least under the Hungarian, Yugoslav, Bulgarian and Rumanian
commission Rules) and the rapporteur (even when not a member of the
commissions) have been the only persons automatically entitled to argue
before or to assist the commissions. At their discretion, however, the
commissions have been free to request the personal appearance of the
claimant who, in turn, has been allowed to be accompanied or represented
by any of a number of expressly listed counselors: avocats at the Conseil
d'Rtat and the Cour de Cassation; avocats regularly enrolled in a French
bar or, under Bulgarian and Rumanian commission Rules, in a bar of a
member State of the European Community; avouis and agris practicing
in the tribunaux de commerce; law professors; the Association Pour la
Sauvegarde et l'Expansion des Biens et Intrts Fran~ais A l']Rtranger; the
Association Nationale des Sinistr~s Fran~ais de Pologne (under the Po-
lish Commission Rules); the Association Nationale des Porteurs de
Valeurs Mobili res (under the Czech Commission Rules); and other
generally interested and technically equipped individuals and groups
authorized by the commissions. Also the commissions have been free,
239. See Polish, Czech and first Yugoslav commission Rides, supra note 233, arts.
15-32; first Hungarian Comnmission Rules, supra note 233, arts. 14-27; second Yugoslav
Commission Rides, supra note 233, arts. 12-29; Bulgarian, Rumanian and second Hun-
garian commission Rules, supra note 233, arts. 9-20.
240. But see Soci~t6 financi~re et industrielle des p~troles et conunissaire du
gouvernement pros de ]a Commission de repartition de l'indemnit6 tch~coslovaque, [1964]
Rec. Cons. d'Et. 233, wherein the Conseil held that the claimant Socijtj was not justified
in contending that the Commission was in error when, on ruling on the claim, it did not
declare the names of the commissioners sitting at the date of the hearing. The Soci&t6
alleged that the same commissioners did not sit in deliberation on the claim three months
later. According to the Conseil "the commission sits validly if three of its members are
present" (author's transl.). Conwra, Sieur Revesz, [1958] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 43, wherein
the Conseil annulled and returned a Hungarian Commission ruling on the grounds that
the Commission's opinion failed to mention the names of the members who participated
in the deliberation of the claim.
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at their gwn initiative or at the request of the claimant, the rapporteur or
the commissaire du gouverneinent (but at the expense of the claimant) to
request oral and written testimony and to designate experts to inquire
into, and report on, such technical problems as might be considered
necessary.241
As for the deliberations and judgment proper, all have had to be re-
stricted to the commission members alone,242 although the dommissaire and
the rapporteur have had the right to serve in a consultative capacity at this
juncture. Decisions have had to be by majority vote except when only
three commissioners have deliberated, in which event a unanimous vote
has been required. When the votes have been equally divided, the Presi-
dent's vote has been decisive (under the Rules of the Polish, Czech and
Yugoslav commissions, and also under the first set of Hungarian Com-
mission Rules) or the "af faire" was postponed to a later deliberative
session (under the Rules of the Bulgarian and Rumanian commissions,
and also under the second set of Hungarian Commission Rules). In all
cases when a required unanimous vote has failed, the "af faire" has had
to be postponed to a later deliberative session. Once made, the decisions
have been required to be reasoned ("motive"), signed by the President
and "registered" along with the minutes ("proc4s-verbal") of each delib-
erative session which the secretary of each commission who, in turn, has
had to communicate the results of the, commission's deliberations to the
claimant and other concerned parties. Thereafter, the commissions have
been free to order a provisional distribution to the successful claimant
who (at least under the Rules of the Polish, Czech and Yugoslav com-
missions, and also under the first set of Hungarian Commission Rules)
has in turn then been free to contest the provisional allocation (as in the
manner outlined above). After having ruled on all claims, including provi-
sional allocation contests, the commissions have been required to draw up
a definitive repartition statement for communication to the Treasury
and for publication, the secretary of each commission having to notify
each claimant of the definitive statement as it concerns them.
C. Conclusions
Overall, then, the French repartition process has been very much of a
piece. However haphazardly they may have been devised, all the French
commissions have borne great resemblance to each other-juridically,
operationally and structurally. This is, probably, the principal reason for
such harmony as has existed among them. Juridically, all have been
both fish and fowl. Stemming neither from "l'ordre judiciare" nor
241. In this connection, see note 237 supra.
242. Compare with note 239 supra.
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from "la hiirarchie administrative,""2 3 they were conceived as "organes
administratifs juridictionnels, de caract~re arbitral marque. '  It is
because of this and because they were ordered to rule "souveraine-
ment" that they were called "Commissions Spiciales." '45 Operationally,
as already suggested, all were inspired by "la notion d'arbitrage. 24"
Individual claimants or their proper representatives have been able to pre-
sent their demands directly to the commissions which, though without
competence to rule on private law issues,2"' could nonetheless render defi-
nitive rulings subject to review only by the Conseil d'Ttat. Also, all par-
took of a mixed adversarial-inquisitorial process, with a commissaire du
gouvernement designated by the Foreign Ministry assuming the role of
advocate on behalf of all the claimants, and the commissions themselves,
at their own initiative, actively pursuing the discovery of relevant
information. And structurally, as seen, the commissions differed only in
incidental degree.
But what relevance has all this, it may be asked, to the international
legal order? Is it possible to attribute any international legal significance
to the decisions rendered by these commissions? These, obviously, are
questions of fundamental importance. The development of the so-called
Law of State Responsibility (or, more precisely, the so-called Law of In-
ternational Claims), it can be argued, is only going to be retarded-or at
least little advanced-by municipal distribution decisions. In some cases
(as in Great Britain, for example, where Orders in Council assume a
prerogative substantive role248), there may be much to justify this con-
tention. In the case of France, however, the argument is less persuasive.
For when we recall that neither the enabling legislation establishing the
French commissions nor the rules of procedure which they themselves
adopted stipulated any system of law, domestic or international, to which
substantive commission decisions should refer, that both these sets of
prescriptions offered only the most minimal jurisprudential (in contrast
to procedural, or operational) guidelines, and that, therefore, the lump
243. G. VIENOT, NATIONALISATIONS kTRANGERES ET INT.RETS FRANCAIS 231 (1953).
244. Bindschedler, La Protection de la Propiitj Privie en Droit Inter ational
Public, 90 HAGUE ACADLMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL RECUEIL DES COuRS 173, 292
(11-1956). See also, note 203 stpra, and authorities cited therein. Cf. Socit6 "La
Huta," [1961] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 313, on appeal from the Polish Commission.
245. See G. VIENOT, supra note 243, at 231.
246. Id. 229.
247. Cf. Socit6 des Laboratories de Reuilly, [1962] Rec. Cons. d'Et. 629, wherein
the Conseil d'Rtat held that the Czech Commission was incompetent to pronounce upon
the existence or validity of an agreement in private law for the purpose of choosing
among competing claimants, and that such issues must be left to the civil courts. For
discussion demonstrating a like approach in American practice, see R. LILLICr,
INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR ADJUDICATION BY NATIONAL COMIIlSSIONs 58-62 (1962).
248. See R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: POSTWAR BRITISH PRAcTIcE 141-42(1967).
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sum settlement agreements themselves, by default or by implied recog-
nition, provided the only significant jurisprudential standards upon
which substantive municipal decisions could be premised, then the
relevance-indeed, the considerable importance-that the decisions of
the commissions spiciales must have for the international legal order
becomes readily apparent. As Bindschedler has remarked, "[1] a loi ni les
arr~tds d'execution ne s'expriment quant au droit applicable; on peut
penser que c'est le droit international, en premier lieu les accords."24
That is, they may fairly be said to be, like the decisions of the more
venerable mixed arbitral tribunals, international legal reference points of
first instance."' And even if this were not entirely so (as of necessity
and in practice it is not), the problem is not one of putatively distinct
systems of national and international law. As McDougal has brilliantly
stated:
The problem is rather one of the reciprocal impact or inter-
action, in the world of operations as well as of words, of inter-
penetrating processes of international and national authority
and control. The relevant hierarchies, if hierarchies are relevant,
are not of rules but of entire social and power processes. The
world power process as a whole may indeed perhaps be insight-
fully viewed as a complex hierarchy of power processes of vary-
ing degrees of comprehension (global, hemispheric, regional,
national, local), with the more comprehensive affecting "in-
ward" or "downward" the less comprehensive, and the latter
in turn affecting "outward" or "upward" the former.2"'
IV. POSTSCRIPT
A final brief word needs to be said about the overall and current
state of postwar French lump sum settlement-national claims commission
practice. Otherwise, our portrayal would be incomplete, if not misleading.
First, the French have not limited their use of the combined device
to the adjustment of Eastern European claims only. They have also ap-
plied it to the resolution of war damage and other incidental claims
249. Supra note 244, at 293.
250. The significance of French foreign claims practice thus approaches the
importance of the equivalent United States practice. See International Claims Settlement
Act of 1949, § 4(a), 22 U.S.C. § 1623 (1955), wherein it is provided that the United
States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission shall apply "provisions of the applicable
claims agreement" and "the applicable principles of international law, justice and
equity." For details, see R. LILLIcH, supra note 247, at 71-75.
251. The Impact of International Law Upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented
Perspective in M. McDouGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 157, 171
(1960). Compare R. LILLICH, supra note 247, at 71-75, 118-22.
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against Austria "' and West Germany."' These applications, however,
due mainly to the nature of the claims and to the special historical relation-
ships of the countries involved, have differed markedly from the format
outlined above. Regrettably, present space limitations prevent giving to
them now the special separate attention that they must ultimately have.5 3a
Second, and as may be recalled, all the French commissions, includ-
ing those created to adjudicate Austrian and German war damage claims,
were established on a temporary basis. That is, all were expected to be
liquidated upon completion of their work. Precisely how far toward this
end each has come and precisely how much money each has awarded or
actually distributed cannot be told at this time. According to one in-
formed source, however, four of the six commissions have completed
either all of their distribution programs (the Polish and Czech commis-
sions) or nearly all thereof (the Hungarian and Yugoslav commissions);
and, of these four, only the Czech Commission has actually "dis-
appeared. ' 1
25 4
Finally, it appears that the French are sufficiently satisfied with the
lump sum settlement-national claims commission device to continue its use
in the future. As noted earlier, the French have recently concluded lump
sum accords with Cuba and the United Arab Republic relative to the in-
demnification of French interests damaged by Cuban and Egyptian so-
cialist reforms,2 the Cuban agreement being in its essential respects like
the Eastern European accords. It is said2 " that the French have or are
about to assign responsibility for adjudicating the claims eligible under
these recent agreements, in the case of the Cuban claims, to the in-
operative but still constituted Polish Commission and, in the case of the
Egyptian claims, to an entirely new commission." 6" The Egyptian ac-
cords, it will be recalled, are relatively unique and not lump sum agree-
ments precisely as defined above. -5 ' Perhaps this alone explains the call
252. See Decree of July 20, 1951, [1954] J.0. 7866, creating the Austrian Commis-
sion.
253. See Decree of November 26, 1963, [1963] J.0. 10907, creating the German
Commission.2 53a. Special attention will have to be given also to France's recent and but re-
cently discovered use of the combined device in connection with French claims against
Cuba and the United Arab Republic, as to which see note 190a supra.
254. Interview with Jean Francois Dervieu, Assistant to the Director of the Service
des Biens et Intrts Priv~s, Minist~re des Affaires P-trang~res, in Paris, September 12,
1967.
255. See note 36 supra.
256. Interview with Andr6 Ernest-Picard, Director of the Association Nationale
des Porteurs Franqais de Valeurs Mobili~res, in Paris, September 11, 1967.
256a. As noted above, these commissions have in fact been so charged and consti-
tuted. See note 190a supra.
257. See notes 20 and 36 supra.
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for a wholly new Egyptian Commission. But the Cuban Accord is a lump
sum agreement stricto sensu. Which raises the question, will now the
French, like the Americans and British before them, after negotiating
future lump sum agreements, soon begin to develop a single, semi-
permanent commission de repartition?
